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THE SCOPE OF IPR ESTOPPEL: A STATUTORY, HISTORICAL, 

AND NORMATIVE ANALYSIS 
Christa J Laser• 
Abstract 
When Congress implemented inter partes review (IPR) and other 
patent post-grant proceedings through the passage ofthe America Invents 
Act (AIA) in 2011, it provided that petitioners would be estopped in later 
proceedings from raising grounds for invalidity that they "raised or 
reasonably could have raised during that inter partes review." 35 U.S.C. 
§ 315( e )(2). However, substantial uncertainty in courts' interpretation of 
this provision causes an enormous impact on an accused patent 
infringer's decision of whether and on what grounds to petition for 
review. One reading of the statutory estoppel provision suggests that 
"during that inter partes review" refers to the time period after institution 
of the IPR and before a final decision from the Patent Trial and Appeal 
Board (PTAB). However, although the Federal Circuit has generally 
favored a textualist reading of this statute, it has yet to address how the 
estoppel standard would apply to grounds that the petitioner chose not to 
include in the petition for IPR. Lower courts have taken widely divergent 
approaches in this and various other factual scenarios where estoppel 
might apply, with some courts assessing legislative history to determine 
that Congress intended estoppel to apply broadly to any grounds that 
could have been raised in the petition. These courts often engage in 
complex assessments of what prior art the petitioner should have known 
about and added to the petition, which adds unnecessary complexity and 
cost to their determinations. This Article will explain that a narrow, 
textualist reading of the IPR estoppel provision is consistent with 
Supreme Court precedent on statutory interpretation and is justified in 
light of the strict limits on IPR petitions adopted by the PT AB-limits 
that Congress did not foresee and which effectively restrict the grounds 
for invalidity that a petitioner may raise during the IPR. When the Federal 
Circuit or the Supreme Court next has occasion to consider this issue, it 
should hold that IPR estoppel applies narrowly only to grounds actually 
raised and instituted. 
• Christa J. Laser is an intellectual property litigation attorney in Washington, D.C. She 
is registered to practice before the United States Patent and Trademark Office. All opinions 
expressed herein are that of the author alone and do not reflect those of her firm or its clients. The 
author thanks the participants in the 2018 Works-In-Progress IP Conference and PatCon 8, 
especially Dmitry Karshtedt, Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Sarah Rajec, Dan Brean, Mark Lemley, Tun­
Jen Chiang, Glynn Lunney, Dennis Crouch, and Michael Risch, for their helpful comments. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On September 16, 2011, the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act 
(AIA)1 was signed into law with goals that included improving patent 
quality and providing new, more efficient means to challenge the validity 
of issued patents. 2 Among other changes, the AIA granted the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) the authority to conduct 
three new forms ofadversarial challenges to an issued patent: interpartes 
review (IPR), post-grant review (PGR), and covered business method 
review (CBMR).3 The AIA further provided that, after the Patent Trial 
and Appeal Board (PT AB) issues a final written decision as to the validity 
of a patent claim in an IPR or PGR, the petitioner or the party bringing 
the challenge, or its privy, is estopped from asserting in any later USPTO 
proceeding, civil litigation, or Section 337 investigation before the 
International Trade Commission (ITC) that the patent claim is invalid "on 
any ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised 
during that inter partes review"; in the case of PGRs, the petitioner is 
estopped from asserting claims of invalidity that it "raised or reasonably 
could have raised during that post-grant review."4 The precise scope of 
this provision is hardly settled, but it has caused a significant 
consideration for nearly every accused infringer in patent litigation since 
the passage of the AIA: Do I risk being estopped from raising evidence 
of invalidity if I choose to challenge this patent's validity faster, and 
potentially cheaper, at the PTAB? 
One reading of the estoppel provisions, and the one advocated in this 
Article, is that the phrase "during that ... review" modifies "raised or 
reasonably could have raised" and refers only to the pendency of the 
review, that is, the time period after institution. Under this reading, a 
petitioner is not estopped from raising grounds for invalidity in litigation 
1. Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
35 U.S.C.). 
2. H.R. REP. No. 112-98, pt. 1, at 39-40 (2011). See infra Part IV for a detailed discussion 
of the impetus and goals for the AIA. 
3. See H.R. REP. No. 112-98, pt. 1, at 39--40, 46--48, 54. 
4. 35 U.S.C. §§ 315(e)(2), 325(e)(2) (2012). Following CBMR, the same provision as 
following PGR applies only in later USPTO proceedings, whereas in civil litigation or ITC 
proceedings, the petitioner is estopped from raising "any ground that the petitioner raised during 
that transitional [CBMR] proceeding." AIA sec. l 8(a)(l ). 
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when it declined to include those grounds in its petition for IPR or PGR. 
This reading is consistent with the AIA's statutory framework for post­
grant proceedings, which clearly delineates the difference between the 
pendency of the post-grant proceeding and the threshold inquiry into 
whether to institute the review. 5 This narrow reading is also the only 
appropriate reading of the AIA's estoppel provisions under the Supreme 
Court's modem, more textualist approach to statutory interpretation. 6 
The Federal Circuit has generally favored a textualist reading of this 
statute, but it has yet to address how the estoppel standard would apply 
to grounds that the petitioner chose not to include in the petition for IPR 
or PGR. The Supreme Court likewise has not addressed this issue. Yet 
many lower courts, after reviewing legislative history that indicates 
Congress intended estoppel following IPRs to apply to any grounds that 
reasonably could have been raised in the petition, have applied a broader 
interpretation of estoppel than a textualist approach would support. In 
addition to deviating from sound principles of statutory interpretation, 
this broad approach is inconsistent with the historical limits on estoppel 
and the AJA' s patent quality goals. 
Section I of this Article provides an overview of the AIA's post-grant 
proceedings and associated estoppel provisions. Section II A describes 
the Supreme Court's shift in statutory interpretation toward textualism. 
Applying this textualist approach, the remainder of Section II examines 
the statutory context of the AJA' s estoppel provisions and the historical 
meaning of key statutory terms in the common law to demonstrate that 
statutory estoppel under the AJA should only apply to grounds for 
invalidity that could be raised during the IPR or PGR (those grounds upon 
which the PTAB instituted review). 
Section III of this Article discusses how courts, including the Federal 
Circuit, have interpreted the AJA's estoppel provisions in prior cases. In 
Section IV, this Article details the surprising legislative history of the 
AJA's estoppel provisions, which indicates that Congress intended 
estoppel to apply narrowly following PGRs and more broadly only 
following IPRs. This Article then concludes with a policy analysis in 
Section V, which explains that a narrow reading of the AJA' s estoppel 
provisions better supports the AIA's patent quality goals, particularly in 
light of the strict procedural limits on post-grant proceedings that render 
the proceedings an incomplete alternative to district court litigation. To 
accomplish Congress's stated patent quality goals, poor quality patents 
must be subject to thorough adversarial review. As this Article will 
explain, these goals are undermined by broadening IPR estoppel so far 
5. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). 
6. Infra Part II. 
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that grounds for invalidity not tested in post-grant review may 
nonetheless be precluded from judicial review. 
I. THE AlA's POST-GRANT PROCEEDINGS AND ASSOCIATED 

ESTOPPEL PROVISIONS 

Among the AIA's three new post-grant proceedings (IPR, PGR, and 
CBMR), the most widely used and widely known is IPR. 7 IPR is an 
adversarial proceeding concerning an issued patent that is conducted by 
a panel of three administrative law judges on the PT AB. 8 A petition for 
IPR may challenge the patentability ofany AIA patent issued at least nine 
months prior to the petition--or any patent issued under pre-AIA 
procedures, starting immediately after issuance-as either anticipated by 
prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102 or obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103.9 The 
grounds for unpatentability must be based only on prior art consisting of 
patents or printed publications. 10 
Whereas court cases proceed immediately upon the filing of the 
complaint, a party challenging a patent at the PT AB must first submit a 
petition requesting institution of the IPR. 11 PT AB procedural rules 
substantially limit the contents of this petition. 12 In the initial years of 
post-grant proceedings, PTAB rules limited petitions for IPR to sixty 
pages of size fourteen font, including claim charts (which were required 
to be presented in portrait orientation). 13 After pushback from 
stakeholders, the PT AB recently modified the page limitation to a word 
7. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT ThrAL AND APPEAL BOARD STATISTICS 2 
(2017), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ AIA %20Statistics _March2017.pdf 
[https://permacc/TW3L-LPBJ] (noting that lPRs constituted 92% of the 6700 total AIA petitions 
filed as of2017, CBMRs constituted 7%, and PGRs constituted 1%). 
8. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 6(c), 31 l(a). 
9. Id. § 311. After passage of the AIA, a technical amendment permitted lPRs to be filed 
on patents issued under the prior first-to-invent system immediately after issuance, rather than 
nine months after issuance. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act Technical Corrections, Pub. L. No. 
112-274, § l(d), 126 Stat. 2456, 2456 (2013). A petition for IPR may not be filed during the 
pendency ofa PGR. 35 U.S.C. § 31 l(c). lPRs also may not be filed if the petitioner previously 
filed a civil action challenging validity or was sued for infringement of the patent more than one 
year prior. Id.§ 315(a}-{b); 37 C.F.R. § 42.101 (2017). 
10. 35 U.S.C. § 3ll(b). 
11. See id.§§ 312, 314(c); St. Jude Med., Cardiology Div., Inc. v. Volcano Corp., 749F.3d 
1373, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ("The statute separates the Director's decision to 'institute' the 
review,§ 314, on one hand, from the Board's 'conduct' of the review 'instituted' by the Director, 
§ 316(c) ...."). 
12. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.24. 
13. 37 C.F.R. § 42.24 (2015) (setting out page limitations); id. § 42.6(a)(2) (requiring size 
fourteen font, as well as double spacing in the body of the petition); id.§ 1.52(a)(l)(iii) (requiring 
all Patent Office filings to be submitted in portrait orientation). 
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count limitation effective May 2, 2016, I4 but it remains restrictive. Under 
current rules, petitions for IPR are limited to 14,000 words including 
claim charts. Is Because petitioners are frequently unable to include and 
adequately explain all possible grounds for unpatentability in a petition 
of only 14,000 words, these procedures effectively limit the number of 
grounds a petitioner may include in the petition for review. This differs 
from court proceedings, where parties may include all possible grounds 
for invalidity in their pleadings, subject only to the limits of Rule 11. I6 
After the petitioner files its petition for review, the patent owner may 
file a preliminary response to the petition setting out the reasons why 
review should not be instituted. I 7 Within three months of that response, 
the PTAB will issue a determination ofwhether to institute review. Is The 
determination to institute is based on a threshold finding of whether the 
petition for review "shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the 
petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 [one] of the claims 
challenged in the petition."I9 The AJA also permits the PTAB to deny a 
petition if it presents ''the same or substantially the same prior art or 
arguments" as previously before the Office. 20 The PT AB' s decision of 
whether to institute review is final and non-appealable.2I 
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu22 
in 2018, the Patent Office typically granted partial institutions, instituting 
review only as to those grounds in the petition that the PT AB believed 
were likely to succeed. 23 The PT AB also sometimes declined to institute 
14. Amendments to the Rules of Practice for Trials Before the Patent Trial and Appeal 
Board, 81 Fed. Reg. 18,750, 18,750 (Apr. 1, 2016). 
15. 37 C.F.R. § 42.24 (2017). 
16. FED. R. C1v. P. 11. 
17. 35 U.S.C. § 313 (2012). This response must be filed within three months. 37 C.F.R. 
§ 42.107. To expedite proceedings, a patent owner may file an election to waive the preliminary 
response. Id. The petitioner may seek leave to reply to a preliminary response on a showing of 
good cause. Id.§ 42.l08(c). 
18. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b). 
19. Id. § 314(a). 
20. Id. § 325(d) ("In determining whether to institute or order a proceeding under this 
chapter [PGR and CBMR], chapter 30 [reexamination], or chapter 31 [IPR], the Director may 
take into account whether, and reject the petition or request because, the same or substantially the 
same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office."). This authority is separate 
from and in addition to the estoppel effect of prior decisions. See id. §§ 315(e), 325(e). 
21. Id.§ 314(d). 
22. 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018). 
23. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.108 (2016) ("When instituting inter partes review, the Board may 
authorize the review to proceed on all or some of the challenged claims and on all or some of the 
grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim .... Inter partes review shall not be instituted 
for a ground of unpatentability unless the Board decides that the petition supporting the ground 
would demonstrate that there is a reasonable likelihood that at least one of the claims challenged 
in the petition is unpatentable."), invalidated in part by SAS Inst. Inc., 138 S. Ct 1348 (2018). 
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review on grounds that it considered "redundant" with other grounds 
upon which it did institute review, either because of substantive overlap 
or other (often unstated) justifications.24 However, following the 
Supreme Court's SAS Institute decision, the PTAB may no longer grant 
partial institutions; ifthe PTAB finds that there is a reasonable likelihood 
that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the claims 
challenged in the petition, the PT AB must institute review as to all 
grounds and all challenged claims. 25 
The PTAB's written institution decision sets out the grounds being 
instituted and a date "on which the review shall commence."26 The parties 
to an IPR may participate in limited discovery that includes depositions 
of declarants, such as expert witnesses, and any discovery the parties 
agree to between themselves, with additional discovery only available 
upon a motion demonstrating that it is "in the interests of justice."27 
Evidence presented must comport with the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
and parties may file motions to exclude, or for protective orders, in 
accordance with these rules. 28 Before the PT AB issues its final written 
decision, the parties are entitled to an oral hearing. 29 Unlike courts, which 
will only find a patent invalid based on "clear and convincing 
evidence,"30 the PTAB may find claims unpatentable after issuance if a 
"preponderance of the evidence" demonstrates their unpatentability.31 
The pendency of review from institution to final decision will generally 
be no more than one year.32 Either party may appeal an adverse final 
decision directly to the Federal Circuit.33 
The AIA provides for statutory estoppel following the PT AB' s final 
written decision in an IPR.34 Specifically, the petitioner to an IPR of a 
24. See Shaw Indus. Grp., Inc. v. Automated Creel Sys., Inc., 817 F.3d 1293, 1299 (Fed. 
Cir. 2016) (discussing the PTAB's redundancy rules and noting that the Federal Circuit lacks 
jurisdiction to review the Board's decision to decline review on redundancy grounds), cert. 
denied, 137 S. Ct. 374 (2016). Some judges raised the concern that the PTAB's frequent failure 
to "provide a reasoned basis how or why grounds are 'redundant"' violated the Administrative 
Procedures Act and was problematic under a broad reading ofthe estoppel provision. Id. at 1302­
05 (Reyna, J., concurring). 
25. SAS Inst. Inc., 138 S. Ct. at 1354--00. 
26. 35 U.S.C. § 314(c). 
27. Id. § 316(a)(5); 37 C.F.R. § 42.51. 
28. 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.54, 42.62, 42.64. 
29. 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(l 0). 
30. Microsoft Corp. v. 141 Ltd. P'ship, 564 U.S. 91, 95 (2011) ("§ 282 requires an invalidity 
defense to be proved by clear and convincing evidence."). 
31. 35 U.S.C. § 316(e). 
32. Id. § 316(a)(l l ). This may be extended up to six months on a showing of good cause. 
Id. 
33. Id.§§ 14l(c), 319; see also id.§ 329 (providing appeal to the Federal Circuit following 
PGR and CBMR). 
34. Id.§ 315(e). 
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patent claim addressed in a final written decision is barred from later 
raising any ground for invalidity at the USPTO or in courts or the ITC 
"that the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised during that 
inter partes review": 
(e) Estoppel.­
(1) Proceedings before the office.-The petitioner in an inter 
partes review of a claim in a patent under this chapter that 
results in a final written decision under section 318(a), or the 
real party in interest or privy of the petitioner, may not 
request or maintain a proceeding before the Office with 
respect to that claim on any ground that the petitioner raised 
or ~easonably could have raised during that inter partes 
review. 
(2) Civil actions and other proceedings.-The petitioner in 
an inter partes review ofa claim in a patent under this chapter 
that results in a final written decision under section 318( a), 
or the real party in interest or privy of the petitioner, may not 
assert either in a civil action arising in whole or in part under 
section 1338 of title 28 or in a proceeding before the 
International Trade Commission under section 337 of the 
Tariff Act of 1930 that the claim is invalid on any ground 
that the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised 
during that inter partes review.35 
The AIA also created PGR proceedings. A petition for PGR may 
challenge patentability on any ground that may serve as an invalidity 
defense under§ 282, including obviousness, novelty, indefiniteness, and 
patentable subject matter, with no limitations on the type ofprior art that 
may be raised.36 A PGR must be filed within nine months of patent 
issuance.37 Like IPRs, PGRs are conducted before a panel of 
administrative law judges on the PTAB and include the right to limited 
discovery and a hearing. 38 Also like IPRs, petitions for PGR are subject 
to procedural limitations, including a maximum word count, though the 
word count is higher than that applicable to petitions for IPR. 39 
The estoppel provision applicable to PGR is substantially identical to 
that applicable in IPR: 
(e) Estoppel.­
(1) Proceedings before the office.-The petitioner in a post­
35. Id. 
36. Id. § 32l(b). 
37. Id. § 32l(c). 
38. Id. § 326(a), (c). 
39. 37 C.F.R. § 42.24 (2017) (18,700 words vs. 14,000 words). 
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grant review of a claim in a patent under this chapter that 
results in a final written decision under section 328(a), or the 
real party in interest or privy of the petitioner, may not 
request or maintain a proceeding before the Office with 
respect to that claim on any ground that the petitioner raised 
or reasonably could have raised during that post-grant 
review. 
(2) Civil actions and other proceedings.-The petitioner in a 
post-grant review of a claim in a patent under this chapter 
that results in a final written decision under section 328(a), 
or the real party in interest or privy of the petitioner, may not 
assert either in a civil action arising in whole or in part under 
section 1338 of title 28 or in a proceeding before the 
International Trade Commission under section 337 of the 
Tariff Act of 1930 that the claim is invalid on any ground 
that the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised 
during that post-grant review.40 
The third new post-grant proceeding, CBMR, is a transitional 
proceeding-available until September 15, 202~that is reserved for 
challenges to the validity of "covered business method" patents, which 
are defined in the statute as patents that claim "performing data 
processing or other operations used in the practice, administration, or 
management of a financial product or service," except ''technological 
inventions."41 The petitioner may petition for CBMR any time after 
patent issuance. 42 CBMR otherwise generally incorporates the standards 
and procedures applicable to PGR, with the exception of the portion of 
PGR' s estoppel provision applicable in courts and the ITC. 4 Estoppel 
following CBMR is available in these fora on grounds "raised during that 
transitional proceeding": 
The petitioner in a transitional proceeding that results in a 
final written decision under section 328(a) of title 35, United 
States Code, with respect to a claim in a covered business 
method patent, or the petitioner's real party in interest, may 
not assert, either in a civil action arising in whole or in part 
40. 35 U.S.C. § 325(e). 
41. AIA,Pub.L.No.112-29,sec.18(d)(l), 125Stat.284,331 (201l)(codifiedasamended 
in scattered sections of35 U.S.C.); 37 C.F.R. 42.300(d). 
42. AIA sec. 18(a)(l )(A) ("The transitional proceeding implemented pursuant to this 
subsection shall be regarded as, and shall employ the standards and procedures of, a post-grant 
review under chapter 32 of title 35, United States Code, subject to the following: (A) Section 
32l(c) of title 35, United States Code, and subsections (b), (e)(2), and (t) of section 325 of such 
title shall not apply to a transitional proceeding."). 
43. Id. 
1136 	 FLORIDA LAW RHVIEW [Vol. 70 
under section 1338 of title 28, United States Code, or in a 
proceeding before the International Trade Commission 
under section 33 7 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. [§] 
1337), that the claim is invalid on any ground that the 
petitioner raised during that transitional proceeding. 44 
II. 	APPLYING THE SUPREME COURT'S MODERN, TEXTUALIST APPROACH 
TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
A. The Supreme Court's Textualist Turn 
Prior to the 20th century, American law typically followed a rule of 
"no recourse" in statutory interpretation; a text's meaning was derived 
from its words and without resort to legislative history.45 Yet, in a period 
lasting at least half of the 20th century and peaking in the 1970s and 
1980s, the Supreme Court began to find importance in legislative intent. 
During that period, the Court resorted more frequently to legislative 
history and other sources external to statutory text, both to resolve 
ambiguities in the text and even to reinteTret clear text according to 
apparent legislative intent or purpose.4 That period is waning; 
particularly over the last twenty years, the Supreme Court has shifted 
again to an increasingly textualist approach to statutory interpretation, in 
part due to the late Justice Scalia's influence on the Court.47 These 
44. Id. sec. 18(a)(l)(D). 
45. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 318 (1897) ("[D]ebates 
in Congress are not appropriate sources of information from which to discover the meaning ofthe 
language of a statute passed by that body."); Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213, 332 (1827) 
("[W]ords are to be understood in that sense in which they are generally used by those for whom 
the instrument was intended ....");ALEXANDER HAMILTON, OPINION ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY 
OF AN ACT TO ESTABLISH A BANK ( 1791 ), reprinted in 8 THE pAPERS OF ALEXANDER llAM1LTON 
63, 111 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1965) ("[W]hatever may have been the intention of the framers of 
a constitution, or of a law, that intention is to be sought for in the instrument itself ...."); 
ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 
369--72 (2012) (collecting citations on historical American statutory interpretation) ("The law as 
it passed is the will ofthe majority ofboth houses, and the only mode in which that will is spoken 
is in the act itself" (quoting Aldridge v. Williams, 44 U.S. 9, 15 (1845))). 
46. Train v. Colo. Pub. Interest Research Grp., Inc., 426 U.S. l, 10 (1976); SCALIA & 
GARNER, supra note 45, at 373-74 (collecting research noting a peak in the citation oflegislative 
history in the 1970s and a return to lower rates of citation in the early 2000s ); Jorge L. Carro & 
Andrew R. Brann, The US. Supreme Court and the Use ofLegislative Histories: A Statistical 
Analysis, 22 JURIMETRICS J. 294, 303 (1982); John F. Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 
98 CALIF. L. REV. 1287, 1291 (2010)(citing, e.g., United States v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 
534, 542 (1940)); Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use ofLegislative History in the 
1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 197-99 (1983). 
47. See SCALIA& GARNER, supra note 45, at 374; James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, The 
Decline and Fall ofLegislative History? Patterns ofSupreme Court Reliance in the Burger and 
Rehnquist Eras, 89 JUDICATURE 220, 222 (2006); Philip P. Frickey, Interpretive-Regime Change, 
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shifting sands are possible because principles of statutory interpretation 
stated in any decision are typically dicta when applied to later cases 
involving different statutes; the principle of stare decisis does not bind 
the Court to continue to follow, in different types of cases, the same 
methods ofstatutory interpretation that were popular a generation prior.48 
Under the Supreme Court's modem, textualist approach, "the 
authoritative statement is the statutory text, not the legislative history or 
any other extrinsic material. "49 These modem cases espouse that "when 
the statute's language is plain, the sole function of the courts-at least 
where the disposition required by the text is not absurd-is to enforce it 
according to its terms."50 
1. Constitutional Demands 
Although the Supreme Court's preference for textualism has changed 
over time, unchanging constitutional principles support its most recent 
renewal. To comply with constitutional demands for bicameralism and 
presentment, Congress must express the law through statutory text that 
both Houses vote upon and present to the President for signature before 
enactment, not through statements made on the floor of Congress or in 
committee reports but left out of the text, which other legislators or the 
President might not agree to and certainty do not vote upon.51 Moreover, 
38 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1971, 1981 (2005) ("The Court relies less on legislative history today than 
it did before Justice Scalia arrived, and it cites dictionaries more frequently. Moreover, no good 
advocate before the Court today would focus an argument almost exclusively on the legislative 
history (as many good advocates did a generation ago)." (footnotes omitted)); Manning, supr.a 
note 46, at 1312-13 (noting "the Court's growing tendency ... simply to stick closely to the text 
of a statute when its semantic import is clear"). 
48. See SCALIA& GARNER, supra note 45, at 87, 412; see also Frickey, supra note 47, at 
1974-81 (discussing the Supreme Court's history of purposivism in interpretation of civil rights 
statutes and concluding that textualism is less likely to take hold in this area due to stare decisis). 
49. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005). 
50. Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004) (quoting Hartford Underwriters Ins. v. 
Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. l, 6 (2000)). Courts do not find absurdity lightly. Allapattah 
Servs., 545 U.S. at 565 (noting that what "may seem odd ... is not absurd"); accord SCALIA & 
GARNER, supra note 45, at 237 ("The absurdity must consist of a disposition that no reasonable 
person could intend."). 
51. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 ("Every bill which shall have passed the House of 
Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of 
the United States ...."); Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 191-92 (1988) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) ("Committee reports, floor speeches, and even colloquies between 
Congressmen, ... are frail substitutes for bicameral vote upon the text of a law and its 
presentment to the President."); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Absence of Method in Statutory 
Interpretation, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 81, 82 (2017) ("Intents are irrelevant even ifdiscemable (which 
they aren't), because our Constitution provides for the enactment and approval of texts, not of 
intents."); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Talking Textualism, Practicing Pragmatism: Rethinking the 
Supreme Court's Approach to Statutory Interpretation, 51 GA. L. REV. 121, 160 (2016). 
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a method of interpretation that looks to legislative history-like 
committee reports-to determine the law impermissibly delegates 
legislative powers to committee staffand the other narrow few who make 
that legislative history, which contravenes the Constitutional requirement 
that the legislative power is "vested in a Congress"-not its staff 
members or a minority of its members. 52 A textualist approach also 
appropriately limits the power of courts to make policy decisions ex 
nihilo, which should be left to elected legislators on issues where they 
have acted through statute, both to ensure that voters have accountable 
representation of their policy interests and to prevent harmful 
politicization of the judiciary. 53 
2. Transparency and Rule of Law 
Where policy justifications for a particular holding are strong, or 
where the legislature clearly intended a result opposite to that arising 
from the clear meaning of the text, it can be tempting to make exceptions 
to the textualist approach in the interests ofjustice in that particular case. 
This is a mistake. 54 As the Supreme Court has stated, "in the long run, 
experience teaches that strict adherence to the procedural requirements 
specified by the legislature is the best guarantee of evenhanded 
administration of the law."55 In addition to conforming to the 
constitutional principles described above, a textualist approach provides 
more certainty to parties and the legislature with regard to how the laws 
52. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a 
Congress of the United States, which shall consist ofa Senate and a House ofRepresentatives."); 
JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GoVERNMENT 87 (Richard H. Cox ed., Harlan Davidson 1982) 
(1689) (stating that legislative power is the power to "make laws, ... not to make legislators"); 
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 45, at 386 ("[L ]egislative power, like judicial power, is 
nondelegable."); John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 
673, 728 (1997); see also Bank One Chi., N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Tr. Co., 516 U.S. 264, 280 
(1996) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("No one would think that 
the House of Representatives could operate in such fashion that only the broad outlines of bills 
would be adopted by vote of the full House, leaving minor details to be written, adopted, and 
voted upon only by the cognizant committees. Thus, if legislation consists of forming an 'intent' 
rather than adopting a text (a proposition with which I do not agree), Congress cannot leave the 
formation of that intent to a small band of its number, but must, as the Constitution says, form an 
intent of the Congress."). 
53. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 45, at xxiii, xxvii. 
54. Id. at 348 ("Ifjudges think no further ahead than achievingjustice in the dispute now at 
hand, the law becomes subject to personal preferences and hence shrouded in doubt."). 
55. Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 826 (1980); see also SCALIA& GARNER, supra 
note 45, at 345 ("The nearer a government approaches towards a republic, the more the manner 
of judging becomes settled and fixed." (quoting MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 93 
(Thomas Nugent trans., Batoche Books 2001) (1748))). 
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will be interpreted than do intentionalist or purposivist approaches. 56 A 
textualist approach ensures that legislators can accurately legislate 
according to the needs of their constituents without fear of judicial 
usurpation of that role and that judges have a firm methodology for 
consistent application of the law from case to case. Indeed, the textualist 
approach encourages legislators to craft statutes carefully so as to reduce 
interpretations contrary to legislative intent. 57 If an outcome is not what 
Congress intended, and if it is significant enough, Congress will change 
the statute.58 
B. Plain Reading in Context 
Under the modem approach, an interpretation of the AIA's statutory 
estoppel provisions must start with the statutory language, read according 
to the plain meaning of its terms. 59 The plain meaning is the meaning that 
reasonable people at the time the text was written would ordinarily 
ascribe to the term, in the context in which it was written. 6 °Courts using 
this approach will not construe the words in isolation, but will instead 
construe terms in light ofthe statute as a whole, considering, for example, 
how the same words are used elsewhere in the statute and whether a 
particular interpretation would irreconcilably clash with other provisions 
56. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 45, at 348 ("[A]lthough properly informed human 
minds may agree on what a text means, human hearts often disagree on what is right."). 
Intentionalism and purposivism are approaches to statutory interpretation that consider 
legislators' intended meaning and the apparent purpose of the statute. 
57. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 45, at xxviii n.2; Daniel A. Farber, Statutory 
Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281, 298 (1989); Frickey, supra note 4 7, 
at 1981 ("If the regime's jurisprudence is transparent to the legislature, legislative staff should be 
able to draft statutes so that legislators can carry out their related business."). 
58. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 45, at 344 ("Perhaps the most efficacious mode of 
procuring good laws, certainly the only one allowable to a Court of Justice, is to act fully up to 
the spirit and language ofbad ones, and to let their inconvenience be fully felt by giving them full 
effect." (quoting Pocock v. Pickering [1852] 18 QB 789 at 798 (Eng.))). 
59. Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton, 137 S. Ct. 1652, 1658 (2017) (looking first 
to statutory text to interpret an ERISA exception and noting that the Court's interpretation will 
"[s]tart ... with the statutory language"); SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 45, at 56. 
60. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 45, at 16 ("In their full context, words mean what they 
conveyed to reasonable people at the time they were written-with the understanding that general 
terms may embrace later technological innovations."); see also id. at 69 ("Words are to be 
understood in their ordinary, everyday meanings--unless the context indicates that they bear a 
technical sense."). 
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in the statute.61 Identical terms used in different parts of a statute are 
presumed to have the same meaning. 62 
A central issue in interpretation of the AIA's estoppel provisions is 
whether the phrase "during that ... review" or "during that transitional 
proceeding,'' which modifies each of the estoppel provisions, 63 means 
during the pendency of the review by the PTAB (the time period after 
institution ofreview and before final decision) or whether this time period 
begins with the petition for review. If the "review" begins only after 
institution, then grounds not raised in the petition or grounds denied 
institution will not be subject to estoppel because they were not raised 
"during that ... review." However, if the "review'' begins with the 
petition, then estoppel will apply to any grounds that the petitioner raised 
or could have raised in its petition for review. The AIA's statutory 
framework for post-grant proceedings provides the critical context to 
answer this interpretive question. 
The AIA's statutory :framework for post-grant proceedings clearly 
delineates between the pendency of the review versus the threshold 
inquiry into whether to institute the review. 64 For example, the statute's 
discussion of the form of the notice of institution ofreview states that the 
"notice shall include the date on which the review shall commence."65 If 
a "review" does not commence until after institution in this section of the 
statute, the phrase "during that . . . review" in the estoppel provisions 
should be read similarly as referring to the time period starting after 
institution. Elsewhere, the statute separates the institution decision from 
the PTAB's "conduct" of the "review."66 When read plainly within this 
statutory context, the qualifying phrase "during that . . . review'' or 
61. IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 34 (2005) ("[T]he normal rule of statutory 
interpretation [is] that identical words used in different parts of the same statute are generally 
presumed to have the same meaning."); Davis v. Mich. Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 
(1989) ("It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be 
read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme."); SCALIA & 
GARNER, supra note 45, at 167-69 (citing K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988); 
United Sav. Ass'n ofTex. v. Timbers oflnwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988)); 
see also Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 826 (1980) (declining to adopt different 
definitions of term in different statutory provisions). 
62. Alvarez, 546 U.S. at 34. 
63. 35 U.S.C. §§ 315(e)(2), 325(e)(2) (2012); AIA, Pub. L. No. 112-29, sec. 18(a)(l), 125 
Stat. 284, 330 (2011) (codified as amended in scattered sections of35 U.S.C.). 
64. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). 
65. Id.§ 314(c). 
66. St. Jude Med., Cardiology Div., Inc. v. Volcano Corp., 749 F.3d 1373, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 
2014) ("The statute separates the Director's decision to 'institute' the review,§ 314, on one hand, 
from the Board's 'conduct' of the review 'instituted' by the Director, § 316(c) ....").Note that 
the Director delegated the institution decision to the PTAB by regulation, but the processes remain 
separate. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.108 (2017). 
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"during that transitional proceeding" clearly serves to limit the triggering 
events for estoppel to the time period occurring during the pendency of 
the review before the PTAB-the time period after institution and before 
the PT AB' s final decision. 
Some might argue that this narrow reading results in an unusual 
reading of the word "raised," because the petitioner's only opportunity to 
"raise" or bring up grounds that can be considered during the review is in 
the petition-there is no opportunity, after institution, to bring up 
additional grounds. However, ifthe estoppel provision is read broadly in 
order to accommodate a reading of the word "raised" to mean "first 
raised," then either the word "during" would have an even more unusual 
reading that includes "not during," or the phrase "inter partes review" 
would carry a different meaning than the remainder of the statute 
provides. "Raised," within the context of this provision, could 
alternatively mean "caused to be considered," such as when the petitioner 
presents its arguments at the hearing before the PTAB. 67 Because 
"during" and "inter partes review'' can have no other broader meaning, 
but "raised" could ordinarily refer to issues presented to the PT AB for 
consideration at any time, any apparent conflict between these meanings 
should be resolved in favor of conserving the ordinary meaning of the 
term "during" and the statutory meaning of the term "inter partes 
review." 
C. Expressio Unius 
Under the Negative Implication Canon, expressio unius est exclusio 
a/terius, the specification of one is the exclusion of another. 68 In 
particular, where a statute provides specific circumstances under which a 
rule, such as estoppel, shall apply, this canon suggests that the rule does 
not apply outside those enumerated circumstances unless the statute 
otherwise indicates that those specifics are not exclusive.69 Applying this 
canon to the AIA's estoppel provisions, the extension of estoppel to "any 
ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised during 
that inter partes review" (emphasis added) necessarily precludes from 
67. See Raise, ENG. OXFORD LIVING DICTIONARIES, en.oxforddictionaries.com/ 
definition/raise [https://perma.cc/3P4U-63K8] ("Cause to occur or be considered."). 
68. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 45, at l 07; see also Hartford Underwriters Ins. v. Union 
Planters Bank, 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000) (finding that a statute specifying that trustees could obtain 
certain relief under a provision of a statute precluded others from obtaining relief under that 
provision). 
69. United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 514 (1974) (finding that a statute establishing 
that certain procedures could be authorized by the Attorney General or Assistant Attorney General 
excluded others from authorizing those procedures, by negative implication); SCALIA & GARNER, 
supra note 45, at 107. 
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this statutory estoppel any circumstances falling outside this specific 
temporal limitation, such as grounds not raised in the petition for review. 
Some might argue that application of this canon would exclude from 
estoppel triggering events that Congress clearly intended to cover. 
However, because statutory provisions are read by interpreting the 
ordinary meaning of words and not the contents of legislators' minds, a 
construction should not change merely because it fails to cover matter or 
reach a scope that the legislature might have intended the provision to 
cover.70 Moreover, as discussed in more detail below, it is often difficult 
to determine what exactly the legislature intended a provision to do, ifthe 
legislature were to have a single cohesive "intent" at all. 
D. Obvious Alternative Canon 
An argument that Congress intended a provision to be read differently 
than according to the plain meaning of the text is particularly 
unpersuasive where "obvious alternative" language is available to convey 
the alternate reading but was not used. 71 Admittedly, this canon has 
significant risk of hindsight bias; most alternatives proposed post facto 
likely never passed through legislators' minds during drafting. 
Nonetheless, this risk is mitigated because the canon is typically only 
applied to further buttress a plain meaning analysis of the statute, the 
constitutional merits of which are explained above, rather than to supply 
a new interpretation.72 
"Obvious alternative" language for the AIA's estoppel provisions is 
available to convey a broad reading that applies to all grounds that could 
70. Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 618 (1992) ("The question ... is not what 
Congress 'would have wanted' but what Congress enacted ...."); Comm'r v. Asphalt Prods. Co., 
482 U.S. 117, 119 (1987) (per curiam) (reading a statute requiring that "[i]f any part of any 
underpayment [of a tax] ... is due to negligence ... there shall be added to the tax an amount 
equal to 5 percent of the underpaymenf' should not be read to limit the penalty to the portion of 
the underpayment that was due to negligence); Ebert v. Poston, 266 U.S. 548, 554 (1925) ("A 
casus omissus does not justify judicial legislation."); SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 45, at 93 
("[A] matter not covered is to be treated as not covered."). 
71. Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 134 S. Ct. 1224, 1227 (2014) (when legislators did not 
adopt "obvious alternative" language, ''the natural implication is that they did not intend" the 
alternative); accord SAS Inst. Inc. v. lancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1356 (2018) ("[I]fCongress wanted 
to adopt the Director's approach it knew exactly how to do so."); Advocate Health Care Network 
v. Stapleton, 137 S. Ct. 1652, 1659 (2017) ("Had Congress wanted, as the employees contend, to 
alter only the maintenance requirement, it had an easy way to do so--differing by only two words 
from the language it chose, but with an altogether different meaning."). 
72. See generally Stapleton, 137 S. Ct. 1652 (applying the obvious alternative canon in this 
way); Manning, supra note 52, at 728 (1997) ("If something appears in the legislative history ... 
then someone in the enactment process necessarily anticipated the point .... The sole impediment 
is the burden of enacting the already-identified legal principle into law through bicameralism and 
presentment-a burden that the Constitution expressly contemplates and requires."). 
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have been raised in the petition for IPR, as intentionalists argue the statute 
should be read. Simply, Congress could have provided that estoppel 
extends to "any ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably could have 
raised in the petition for inter partes review." The modified provision 
would thus read: 
The petitioner in an inter partes review of a claim in a 
patent under this chapter that results in a final written 
decision under section 318( a), or the real party in interest or 
privy of the petitioner, may not assert either in a civil action 
arising in whole or in part under section 1338 of title 28 or 
in a proceeding before the International Trade Commission 
under section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 that the claim is 
invalid on any ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably 
could have raised duri:Bg that inter partes reYiew in the 
petition for inter partes review. 73 
This "obvious alternative" language further supports the narrow plain 
reading of the statutory text. 
E. Surplusage Canon or Avoidance ofNullity 
The "surplusage canon" provides that courts should "give effect, if 
possible, to every clause and word of a statute" and "presum[ e] that each 
word Congress uses is there for a reason."74 However, the "preference for 
avoiding surplusage constructions is not absolute."75 In a conflict 
between a plain reading that renders a word or phrase a surplusage and a 
reading that avoids surplusage but creates ambiguity within the text, the 
Supreme Court has stated that courts "should prefer the plain meaning."76 
Application of this canon to the AIA's estoppel provisions arguably 
yields competing nullities, though only one reading both limits a nullity 
and remains consistent with plain meaning. 
1. "during that ... review" 
A reading of the AIA's estoppel provision whereby events occurring 
prior to institution trigger estoppel renders the statutory phrase "during 
that inter partes review" or "during that post-grant review" a nullity. 
73. Cf 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2) (2012). 
74. Stapleton, 137 S. Ct. at 1659 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404 (2000)) 
(rejecting reading ofERISA exception that required viewing a phrase as "stray marks on a page"); 
accord Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 208 n.53 (1985) ("[W]e must give effect to every word that 
Congress used in the statute."); SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 45, at 174-79 ("These words 
cannot be meaningless, else they would not have been used." (quoting United States v. Butler, 
297 U.S. I, 65 (1936))). 
75. Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 536 (2004). 
76. Id.; accord SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 45, at 176 ("[A] court may well prefer 
ordinary meaning to an unusual meaning that will avoid surplusage."). 
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What purpose does this phrase serve if not to place a temporal limitation 
on the triggering events for estoppel to only grounds raised during the 
pendency of the review? Indeed, the only way a broad reading would not 
render this phrase a nullity is if the meaning of the phrase "inter partes 
review" or "post-grant review" is broadly defmed to include not only the 
pendency of the review, but also the time period of the petition for review 
and deliberation on whether to institute review. However, as explained 
above, such a broad defmition would conflict with the context of the 
statute-which delineates between these two time periods-and the 
meaning of the term "review" as used throughout the statute. 77 Because a 
broad reading would render the phrase "during that inter partes review" 
a nullity, the surplusage canon cautions against such a reading. 
2. "reasonably could have raised" 
In an alternative application of this canon, some might argue that a 
narrow reading of the estoppel statute renders the phrase "or reasonably 
could have raised" a nullity. However, this is not necessarily true. 78 One 
circumstance under which a petitioner "reasonably could have raised" art 
during the review, but did not, is if a prior art combination is a subset of 
instituted grounds. For example, if the petitioner argues that a claim is 
obvious over the combination of three references (A, B, and C), the 
petitioner reasonably could have raised obviousness over a subset (A and 
B) during the course ofthe review. The "or reasonably could have raised" 
language would permit a court to apply estoppel to later arguments that 
the patent was obvious over the subset. At least one court applying a 
textualist approach to IPR estoppel adopted this understanding to fmd that 
estoppel applies to subsets of instituted grounds.79 More broadly, a 
petitioner might simply choose, for strategic reasons or because of 
limitations on space or time, to focus on certain grounds for 
unpatentability during the course of the review despite having included 
more grounds in its petition for review, such as if the institution decision 
provides insight on which grounds are most likely to succeed before the 
Board. Grounds that the petitioner includes in its petition but chooses not 
to address at the hearing or otherwise during the pendency of the review 
77. E.g., 35 U.S.C. § 314(c). 
78. Also note that in some statutes, two phrases separated by the word "or" may be 
considered synonyms rather than the second item being read as surplusage, such as in "exemplary 
or punitive damages." SCALIA& GARNER, supra note 45, at 122. 
79. Verinata Health, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc, No. 12-CV-05501-SI, 2017 WL 
235048, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2017) ("The Court finds that defendants raised, or could have 
raised, these grounds in the IPR proceedings, as the combination of Dhallan and Binladen is 
simply a subset of the instituted grounds."). Note that under this approach, estoppel would not 
extend to combinations of instituted "prior art as combined with art not presented," such as a 
combination ofA and D. Id. at *4 n.4. 
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are grounds that it "reasonably could have raised during that inter partes 
review." 
Those who favor a broad approach might argue that the difference in 
language between the estoppel provisions for IPR and PGR, which refer 
to grounds the petitioner "raised or reasonably could have raised," and 
the provision for CBMR, which only refers to grounds "raised," confirms 
that the "reasonably could have raised" language is not surplusage and 
that there is a difference in meaning. However, even if there is a 
difference in meaning, a unique meaning ofthe phrase "reasonably could 
have raised" does not alter the temporally limiting phrase "during 
that ... review" or "during that transitional proceeding" that immediately 
follows it and qualifies it in each of the estoppel provisions. Regardless 
ofthe meaning of"reasonably could have raised," the "during ..." phrase 
continues to restrict the triggering events for estoppel to those arising 
post-institution. A unique case might arise where the distinction between 
"raised ... during ... that review'' and "reasonably could have raised 
during . . . that review'' is relevant, such as if a court were trying to 
determine whether a petitioner is estopped from raising subsets of 
instituted grounds following CBMR. Nevertheless, because the 
distinction does not modify the temporal qualifier, it is not relevant to the 
determination of meaning at issue here: Whether a petitioner is estopped 
from raising in later proceedings a ground not raised in the petition for 
review. 
Ultimately, a reading under which "reasonably could have raised" 
refers to grounds raised at a time other than during the pendency ofreview 
places this phrase in conflict with its immediate modifying phrase, 
"during that inter partes review." Because reading this provision broadly 
to avoid "reasonably could have raised" becoming surplusage creates 
rather than resolves ambiguity, whereas a narrow reading that avoids 
"during that . . . review" becoming surplusage comports with plain 
meaning, courts should prefer the plain, narrow reading.80 Alternatively, 
perhaps this is a conflict resulting from imperfect draftsmanship, where 
a nullity is created under any reading of the statute. If so, the two 
competing nullities must be reconciled. However, only one reading both 
limits a nullity and remains consistent with the other canons of statutory 
construction described above and below: a narrow reading. 
F. Imputed Common Law 
Under the canon of imputed common law meaning, a common law 
term in a statute ordinarily carries its common law meaning, elements, 
80. See Lamie, 540 U.S. at 536. 
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and limitations.81 Although there are several types of preclusion in the 
common law, the AIA's statutory estoppel provisions refer to "estoppel" 
and "estopped. "82 These are terms that, as explained below, convey a 
unique meaning from the other forms of preclusion available under the 
common law.83 Imputing the common law of estoppel into the AlA's 
estoppel provision results in a narrow reach that does not extend to 
grounds that were not both fully and fairly litigated between the parties 
and decided in a judicial manner by the PTAB. Additionally, it yields a 
81. Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 1999 (2016) ("(I]t is a 
settled principle ofinterpretation that, absent other indication, Congress intends to incorporate the 
well-settled meaning of the common-law terms it uses." (quoting Sekhar v. United States, 570 
U.S. 729, 732 (2013))); Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 23 (1999) (imputing a requirement of 
materiality from the common law test for fraud to a statute using an undefined term "defraud"); 
Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 259-60 (1992) ("[W]here Congress borrows terms ofart in 
which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably 
knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the body of 
learning from which it was taken and the meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind unless 
otherwise instructed. In such case, absence of contrary direction may be taken as satisfaction with 
widely accepted definitions, not as a departure from them." (quoting Morissette v. United States, 
342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952))); Nationwide Mut. Ins. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322 (1992) ("[W]here 
Congress uses terms that have accumulated settled meaning under ... the common law, a court 
must infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress means to incorporate the 
established meaning ofthese terms." (quoting Cmty. For Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 
730, 739-40 (1989))); SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 45, at 320 ("A statute that uses a common­
law term, without defining it, adopts its common-law meaning."); see also Microsoft Corp. v. 141 
Ltd. P'ship, 564 U.S. 91, 102 (2011) ("Under the general rule that a common-law term comes 
with its common-law meaning, we cannot conclude that Congress intended to 'drop' the 
heightened standard of proof from the presumption simply because § 282 fails to reiterate it 
expressly."); Gilbert v. United States, 370 U.S. 650, 655 (1962) ("For in the absence of anything 
to the contrary it is fair to assume that Congress used that word in the statute in its common-law 
sense."); McCool v. Smith, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 459, 469 (1861) ("[W]henever our Legislature 
use[s] a term without defining it ... they must be supposed to use it in the sense in which it is 
understood in the English law." (quoting Hillhouse v. Chester, 3 Day 166, 211-12 (Conn. 1808)) ). 
This cannon is distinct from the cannon against interpretation in derogation of the common law, 
see United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993), which some might argue is not a textualist 
cannon. In contrast, interpreting an undefined statutory term that has an established meaning at 
common law according to the common law meaning is a textualist form ofstatutory interpretation, 
like using dictionaries from the time of enactment to define an undefined term. 
82. E.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 315(e), 325(e). 
83. Some might argue that the common law meaning should not be imputed here because 
the statute provides for the conditions under which estoppel will apply, overriding the common 
law meaning. But in choosing between a broad or narrow scope reading of the provision, the 
common law meaning of the terms used should be considered. Moreover, as the Supreme Court 
has applied this canon in the past, the common law meaning of terms used in statute will apply 
absent an indication in the text to derogate from it; the mere failure to mention factors or 
considerations imputed from that common law is not considered a contrary indication. E.g., Evans 
v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 259-60 (1992); Nader v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 23 (1999). 
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surpnsmg new argument to curb untoward practices (such as panel 
stacking) at the PT AB. 
1. Estoppel' s Distinct Origin in Common Law 
Over the course of a millennium, two primary types of common law 
preclusion based on prior adjudication arose from two distinct legal roots 
and with two distinct standards and purposes: res judicata, also called 
claim preclusion, and estoppel, also called issue preclusion.84 Res 
judicata (or claim preclusion) derives from the Roman principle of the 
same name. 85 Its historical purpose was to provide repose to parties from 
the threat oflitigation ofsuccessive claims by the same party arising from 
the same circumstances. 86 When it was incorporated into English law by 
the early 11 OOs, the principle retained this rationale of protection of 
private persons from "re-agitation."87 
Res judicata or claim preclusion comprises the two related doctrines 
ofmerger and bar.88 Under the doctrine ofmerger, when a final judgment 
84. See 18 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 131.11 (Matthew Bender 3d ed. 2017) (citing 
Developments in the Law-Res Judicata, 65 HARV. L. REV. 818, 820--21 (1952)) ("The doctrine 
of claim preclusion has its origins in Roman civil law, but has been part of English common law 
for almost nine centuries."); Alexandra Bursak, Preclusions, 91 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1651, 1660--69 
(2016) (describing the separate histories of res judicata, which arose from Roman law, and 
collateral estoppel, derived from Anglo-Norman law). Note that courts sometimes imprecisely 
apply the term "resjudicata" in a broader sense. Weaver Corp. v. Kidde, Inc., 701 F. Supp. 61, 63 
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) ("One difficulty is that courts use 'resjudicata' for two different concepts. Some 
use it to mean claim preclusion. Others employ res judicata in a general sense, to encompass both 
claim and issue preclusion."); see also Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008) (applying the 
term res judicata to both claim and issue preclusion). This Article will use these terms consistently 
with their historical roots by referring to res judicata only for claim preclusion, not as 
encompassing both claim and issue preclusion. In addition to the types of preclusion arising from 
judgments, as discussed herein, other types of preclusion may arise. These include, for example, 
estoppel in pais, under which "a person who makes a representation may be estopped to deny its 
truth if the person to whom it was made has changed his position in reliance." RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS§ 27, cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1982). Given that the context of the AIA's 
estoppel provisions refers to estoppel following a final written decision of the PTAB, the type of 
estoppel applicable to this provision will be the form of estoppel based on prior decision, not 
estoppel in pais. 
85. Bursak, supra note 84, at 1661 (describing the historical application of res judicata in 
Roman law). 
86. Id. at 1661-63 (describing policy justifications expressed in Roman texts, noting, "[t]he 
policy rationale offered in Roman treatises ... reflects the private nature of res judicata"). 
87. Id. at 1663 (quoting GEORGE SPENCER BOWER & SIR ALEXANDER KJNGCOME TURNER, 
THE DocnuNE OF REs JUDICATA 412 (2d ed. 1969)); Robert Wyness Millar, The Historical 
Relation ofEstoppel by Record to Res Judicata, 35 ILL. L. REV. 41, 44 (1940) ("[B]y the opening 
years of the 11 OOs, at latest, the Roman principle of res judicata had entered into the law of 
England."). 
88. Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 77 n. l (1984) ("Claim 
preclusion therefore encompasses the law of merger and bar."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
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is entered in favor of a plaintiff, Plaintiff's claim and any of Defendant's 
defenses to that claim are extinguished and merged into the judgment. 89 
Likewise, under the doctrine of bar, a final judgment rendered on the 
merits in favor of the defendant will serve as a bar to another action by 
the plaintiff encompassing the same claim.90 The scope of the "claim" 
that is merged or barred extends not only to the precise causes of action 
and defenses asserted, but to any claims, causes ofaction, or defenses that 
arise from the same transaction or series oftransactions.91 
Estoppel, also called issue preclusion or direct and collateral estoppel, 
arose from Anglo-Norman principles oflaw; the name estopfiel is derived 
from the French estoupe, meaning a stop or conclusion. 2 Unlike the 
private justifications of res judicata, Anglo-Norman estoppel arose from 
''the notion of the inviolableness of the record."93 In particular, it 
JUDGMENTS, ch. 3, topic 2, intro. note ("Ordinarily, if the judgment was rendered for the plaintiff, 
the claim is held to be extinguished and merged in the judgment; if the judgment was rendered 
for the defendant, the claim is likewise held to be extinguished, and the judgment is a bar to a 
second action on the same claim."). 
89. Hallco Mfg. Co. v. Foster, 256 F.3d 1290, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("The general concept 
of claim preclusion is that when a final judgment is rendered on the merits, another action may 
not be maintained between the parties on the same 'claim,' and defenses that were raised or could 
have been raised in that action are extinguished."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS§ 18; 
see also Migra, 465 U.S. at 77 n.l ("Claim preclusion refers to the effect of a judgment in 
foreclosing litigation of a matter that never has been litigated, because of a determination that it 
should have been advanced in an earlier suit Claim preclusion therefore encompasses the law of 
merger and bar."). 
90. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS§ 19 ("It is frequently said that a valid and final 
personal judgment for the defendant will bar another action on the same claim only ifthe judgment 
is rendered 'on the merits."'). "On the merits" generally means after resolution of the substantive 
issues in the case, though it could also include judgments that a statute or rule ofthe court provides 
will operate as an adjudication on the merits. Id. 
91. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008) (noting that claim preclusion applies 
"whether or not relitigation of the claim raises the same issues as the earlier suit" (quoting New 
Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 748 (2001))); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24. 
Exemplifying the private nature ofclaim preclusion and its emphasis on claim identity, the Federal 
Circuit has found, for example, that ajudgment ofinfringement and no invalidity ofpatent claims 
would only bar a later validity challenge to those claims under the doctrine ofclaim preclusion if 
the accused device in the second suit was "essentially the same" as the device at issue in the prior 
judgment, such that the second suit could be said to involve the same claim or transaction as the 
prior judgment. Hal/co Mfg., 256 F.3d at 1295-97. 
92. Bursak, supra note 84, at 1663-65 (quoting Millar, supra note 87, at 45). Anglo­
Norman estoppel was first incorporated into English law as "estoppel by record" between the 
1100s and 1300s. Id. at 1664; Millar, supra note 87, at 44-45. 
93. Bursak, supra note 84, at 1663; Millar, supra note 87, at 45; accord MELVILLE M. 
BIGELOW, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF ESTOPPEL OR OF INCONTESTABLE RIGHTS 8 (James N. Carter 
ed., 6th ed. rev. 1913) ("[T]he record has conclusive effect upon all the world. It imports absolute 
verity, not only against the parties to it and those in privity with them, but against strangers 
also ...."); Colin Hugh Buckley, Issue Preclusion and Issues ofLaw: A Doctrinal Framework 
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prevented parties from later disputing matters that were already 
established by the record ofearlier proceedings, whether by admission or 
by judicial decision, in any later case touching on any type of claim.94 
Although the doctrine of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion in 
American law is nuanced, its modem form essentially provides that 
"[w ]hen an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a 
valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the 
judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between 
the parties, whether on the same or a different claim. "95 Any 
determination, whether of"evidentiary fact, of 'ultimate fact' (that is, the 
application oflaw to fact), or oflaw," may be foreclosed via estoppel. 96 
Early in American law, a party could not assert collateral estoppel unless 
both parties participated in the prior action, a requirement known as 
mutuality.97 However, in a 1971 case, the Supreme Court abolished the 
requirement of mutuality in patent cases, holding that estoppel could 
apply to any party that had a "full and fair opportunity to litigate" the 
issue in the prior proceeding. 98 
The requirement that the party to be estopped must have had a full and 
fair opportunity to litigate the issue arises from principles of procedural 
due process that have since been incorporated into the common law of 
estoppel.99 "[T]he federal common law ofpreclusion is, ofcourse, subject 
Based on Rules ofRecognition, Jurisdiction and Legal History, 24 Haus. L. REV. 875, 879, 901 
(1987) (noting that estoppel "sought to protect the integrity of the court," by assuring that judicial 
decisions "are well-regarded and not immediately subject to a 'second opinion"'). 
94. Bursak, supra note 84, at 1663-64; Millar, supra note 87, at 45. 
95. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27; accord Taylor, 553 U.S. at 892 ("Issue 
preclusion, in contrast, bars 'successive litigation of an issue of fact or law actually litigated and 
resolved in a valid court determination essential to the prior judgment,' even ifthe issue recurs in 
the context of a different claim." (quoting New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 748--49 
(2001))); Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 414 (2000) ("It is the general rule that issue 
preclusion attaches only '[w]hen an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a 
valid and final judgment ...."' (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS§ 27)); see also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27, cmt. h. (noting that issue preclusion should not 
apply where the judgment is not necessarily dependent upon the determination of an issue, 
because such a determination would ordinarily not be subject to appeal and thus might not have 
been adequately considered). 
96. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS§ 27, cmt. c. 
97. Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U.S. 638, 645 (1936), overruled in part by Blonder-Tongue 
Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971). 
98. Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 329. In Parklane Hosiery, the Supreme Court further 
extended collateral estoppel to "offensive" uses against defendants. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. 
Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331-32 (1979). 
99. 18 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 84, § 132.04 ("A determination can have 
issue preclusive (or collateral estoppel) effect only ifthe proceeding in which it was made afforded 
the party against whom estoppel is asserted a hearing on that issue that comports with due 
process."); see also Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 329 (citing Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 
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to due process limitations."100 To comply with principles of due process, 
the party to be estopped must at least have had the opportunity to present 
the issue at a hearing101 before an impartial tribunal102 with the 
opportunity for cross-examination of witnesses103 and a decision on the 
record. 104 When based on administrative agency decisions, preclusion 
may only apply if the agency made the decision in a "judicial 
capacity."105 The element of fairness may implicate additional 
considerations, which a court must weigh holistically according to a 
"sense ofjustice and equity" to determine whether estoppel should apply. 
These additional considerations include "incentive to litigate," "whether 
the first validity determination purported to employ the standards" oflaw 
then in force, and "whether without fault of his own the [party to be 
estopped] was deprived of crucial evidence or witnesses in the first 
litigation." 106 The Restatement provides certain other "essential elements 
(1940)) ("Some litigants-those who never appeared in a prior action-may not be collaterally 
estopped without litigating the issue. They have never had a chance to present their evidence and 
arguments on the claim. Due process prohibits estopping them despite one or more existing 
adjudications of the identical issue which stand squarely against their position."); REsTATEMENT 
(SECOND} OF JUDGMENTS§ 27, cmt. e ("Ajudgment is not conclusive in a subsequent action as to 
issues which might have been but were not litigated and determined in the prior action."). Some 
cases have also held that these due process limitations apply to resjudicata. E.g., Kremer v. Chem. 
Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 481 n.22 (1982) ("While our previous expressions ofthe requirement 
of a full and fair opportunity to litigate have been in the context of collateral estoppel or issue 
preclusion, it is clear from what follows that invocation of res judicata or claim preclusion is 
subject to the same limitation."). 
100. Taylor, 553 U.S. at 891 (citing Richards v. Jefferson Cty., 517 U.S. 793, 797 (1996)). 
101. 18 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 84, § 132.04; see also Mathews v. Eldridge, 
424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965); Baldwin v. Hale, 68 
U.S. (1 Wall.) 223, 233 (1863). 
102. See Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 195 (1982); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 
271 (1970). 
103. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 269; cf 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (2012) ("A party is entitled to 
present his case or defense by oral or documentary evidence, to submit rebuttal evidence, and to 
conduct such cross-examination as may be required for a full and true disclosure of the facts."). 
104. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 271 ("[T]he decision maker should state the reasons for his 
determination and indicate the evidence he relied on ...."). 
105. Cf United States v. Utah Const. & Min. Co., 384 U.S. 394, 422 (1966) (noting in dicta, 
"When an administrative agency is acting in a judicial capacity and resolves disputed issues of 
fact properly before it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate, the courts 
have not hesitated to apply res judicata to enforce repose."); see also B&B Hardware v. Hargis 
Indus., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1299 (2015) ("[A] court should give preclusive effect to TIAB decisions 
if the ordinary elements of issue preclusion are met."). Whether common law preclusion could 
apply where statutory estoppel does not is beyond the scope of this Article. 
106. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 333-34 (1971); see 
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS§ 27, cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1982) ("There are many 
reasons why a party may choose not to raise an issue, or to contest an assertion, in a particular 
action. The action may involve so small an amount that litigation of the issue may cost more than 
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of adjudication" in order for preclusion to satisfy due process 
requirements, one of which highlights the need for a proceeding with 
sufficient time and space for consideration of the issues to be 
precluded. 107 
2. Limitations Arising from The Imputed Common Law 
Imputing the common law of estoppel requires that a party only be 
estopped from raising issues that it had a full and fair opportunity to 
litigate, according to the standards ofprocedural due process, in the prior 
proceeding. 108 Therefore, if a petitioner fails to include grounds for 
unpatentability in its petition for review, or if PTAB declines to institute 
review for any reason, a petitioner cannot be estopped from asserting 
those grounds for invalidity in a later proceeding because the issues were 
not subject to a hearing, cross-examination, a decision on the record, and 
other requirements of a "full and fair opportunity to litigate" under the 
common law. In other words, when the common law is imputed into the 
meaning of "estoppel" and "estopped" in the AIA, statutory estoppel 
under the AIA can apply only to those grounds on which the PT AB 
instituted and conducted a review and issued a decision on the merits. 
The imputed common law aligns precisely with the narrow, textualist 
reading of the AIA's estoppel provisions presented above. 
Imputing the common law of estoppel could also have the surprising 
effect of curbing the PTAB' s untoward practice of "panel stacking" if 
courts applying this paradigm find that stacked panels are not "impartial 
tribunals" decided in a ''judicial capacity" and therefore do not satisfy the 
prerequisites for estoppel. In 2015, an attorney for the USPTO stated in 
oral argument before the Federal Circuit that the Director of the Patent 
the value of the lawsuit. Or the forum may be an inconvenient one in which to produce the 
necessary evidence or in which to litigate at all. The interests of conserving judicial resources, of 
maintaining consistency, and of avoiding oppression or harassment of the adverse party are less 
compelling when the issue on which preclusion is sought has not actually been litigated before. 
And if preclusive effect were given to issues not litigated, the result might serve to discourage 
compromise, to decrease the likelihood that the issues in an action would be narrowed by 
stipulation, and thus to intensify litigation. It is true that it is sometimes difficult to determine 
whether an issue was actually litigated; even if it was not litigated, the party's reasons for not 
litigating in the prior action may be such that preclusion would be appropriate. But the policy 
considerations outlined above weigh strongly in favor ofnonpreclusion, and it is in the interest of 
predictability and simplicity for such a result to obtain uniformly."). 
107. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUOOMENTS § 83(2)( e) ("Such other procedural elements as 
may be necessary to constitute the proceeding a sufficient means of conclusively determining the 
matter in question, having regard for the magnitude and complexity of the matter in question, the 
urgency with which the matter must be resolved, and the opportunity of the parties to obtain 
evidence and formulate legal contentions."). 
108. See supra Part H.F. I. 
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Office on occasion added additional administrative law judges to a PT AB 
panel to ensure the results the USPTO wanted. 109 The USPTO explained 
this practice as an acceptable means of executing the Director's policy 
goals. 110 Regardless of whether this practice is permissible as a whole, 
which is beyond the scope of this Article, post-grant proceedings decided 
in this manner may not comport with the imputed due process 
prerequisites under the common law of estoppel-namely the 
requirement that to comply with procedural due process a decision to be 
estopped must be made by an impartial tribunal. Courts imputing the 
common law requirements of estoppel to the AIA' s statutory estoppel 
provisions could choose not to apply estoppel to decisions rendered by 
impartial stacked panels. 
109. Oral Argument at 47:13, Yissum Research Dev. Co. of the Hebrew Univ. of Jerusalem 
v. Sony Corp. 626 F. App'x 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Nos. 15-1342, 15-1343), 
http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=2015-I 342.mp3. 
USPTO: And, there's really only one outlier decision, the SkyHawke decision, 
and there are over twenty decisions involvingjoinder where the-
Judge Taranto: And, anytime there has been a seeming other-outlier you've 

engaged the power to reconfigure the panel so as to get the result you want? 

USPTO: Yes, your Honor. 

Judge Taranto: And, you don't see a problem with that? 

USPTO: Your Honor, the Director is trying to ensure that her policy position is 

being enforced by the panels. 

Judge Taranto: The Director is not given adjudicatory authority, right, under§ 6 

of the statute that gives it to the Board? 
USPTO: Right. To clarify, the Director is a member of the Board. But, your 
Honor is correct-
Judge Taranto: But after the panel is chosen, I'm not sure I see the authority there 
to engage in case specific re-adjudication from the Director after the panel has 
been selected. 
USPTO: That's correct, once the panel has been set, it has the adjudicatory 
authority and the-
Judge Taranto: Until, in your view, it's reset by adding a few members who will 
come out the other way? 
USPTO: That's correct, your Honor. We believe that's what Alappat holds. 
Id. 
110. Id. 
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G. Administrative Agency Deference 
In Chevron, US.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc., 111 the Supreme Court stated that courts must defer to an agency's 
"reasonable interpretation" of "ambiguous" terms in statutes that the 
agency "administers"-known as Chevron deference. 112 However, for 
Chevron deference to apply, there must be either an explicit or implicit 
delegation oflaw-making authority to the agency with respect to the issue 
to be decided-such as if the statute grants the agency rulemaking 
authority or charges the agency with sole enforcement-and the position 
to receive deference must have been promulgated pursuant to that 
authority. 113 Particularly if it is applied more broadly than this, but even 
in its ordinary course, Chevron deference raises serious questions of 
compatibility with the Constitution's principles of separation of powers 
and nondelegation. 114 Perhaps, like all rules of statutory construction, 
there is no requirement under stare decisis to continue to apply Chevron 
deference in later cases involving different interpretative questions and 
111. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
112. Id. 842-44. 
113. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001) ("We hold that 
administrative implementation ofa particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference 
when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying 
the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the 
exercise ofthat authority."); Cass R. Sun stein, Law and Administration after Chevron, 90 COLUM. 
L. REV. 2071, 2094 (1990) ("Chevron applies only when an agency is exercising the power to 
make rules or otherwise carrying out legislatively delegated interpretive authority .... Ifagencies 
are simply interpreting a statute, but have not been granted the power to 'administer' it, the 
principle ofdeference should not apply."); see also Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649 
(1990) ("A precondition to deference under Chevron is a congressional delegation of 
administrative authority."). 
114. E.g., Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149, 1152 (10th Cir. 2016) 
(Gorsuch, J., concurring) ("Chevron and BrandXpermit executive bureaucracies to swallow huge 
amounts ofcore judicial and legislative power and concentrate federal power in a way that seems 
more than a little difficult to square with the Constitution of the framers' design .... Transferring 
the job of saying what the law is from the judiciary to the executive unsurprisingly invites the 
very sort of due process (fair notice) and equal protection concerns the framers knew would arise 
ifthe political branches intruded on judicial functions."); Sunstein, supra note 113, at 2074 ("This 
principle is quite jarring to those who recall the suggestion, found in Marbury v. Madison [, 5 
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803),] and repeated time and again in American public law, that it is 
for judges, and no one else, to 'say what the law is.'"). Chevron deference also does not fit within 
a textualist interpretive regime because it uses extrinsic, later-derived, and potentially ever­
changing sources to derive a text's meaning. 
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different statutory schemes.115 Yet, rightly or wrongly, it is one of the 
most entrenched statutory interpretative canons. 116 
The PTAB has generally adopted a broad reading of the AIA's 
statutory estoppel provisions to find that a party is estopped from raising 
grounds that it could have included in the petition for review but did 
not. 117 Nonetheless, Chevron does not require courts to abide by the 
PTAB's interpretation of these provisions. First, the AIA does not 
delegate law-making authority to the USPTO to promulgate or 
"administer" the law of the estoppel provisions. Although the USPTO 
may on occasion apply the estoppel provisions to later USPTO 
proceedings, the statute does not delegate interpretive authority 
exclusively to the USPTO, but rather provides that courts, the ITC, and 
the USPTO each have independent authority to apply statutory estoppel 
following post-grant proceedings. 118 Indeed, the AIA grants the USPTO 
rulemaking authority over some procedures for post-grant proceedings, 
but does not do the same with respect to the estoppel provisions. 119 
Second, decisions of isolated PTAB panels do not rise to the level of 
agency rulemaking that is ordinarily entitled to Chevron deference. 120 
Third, the AIA's estoppel provisions are sufficiently clear to be 
interpreted by the court using traditional tools of statutory construction, 
leaving no gap to be filled by administrative agency deference. 121 As 
described above, the qualifier "during that ... review" can have only one 
plain meaning when read in the context of the overall statutory scheme: 
limiting the triggering events for estoppel to those occurring during the 
pendency of the review, that is, after institution. 122 Because the statute is 
unambiguous, "that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the 
agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of 
Congress."123 · 
115. Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1157-58 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) ("Chevron is a 
procedural rule, and procedural rules generally receive little precedential consideration when 
experience proves them problematic in their administration."); see also SCALIA & GARNER, supra 
note 45, at 87, 412; Frickey, supra note 47, at 1976, 1981 (discussing the role of stare decisis in 
interpretive regime change). 
116. See Sunstein, supra note 113, at 2074-75 (describing the extensive citation ofChevron). 
11 7. Discussed in more detail infra Part III.B. 
118. 35 U.S.C. §§ 315(e), 325(e) (2012). 
119. Compare id.§ 316 with id. § 315(e). 
120. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234 (200l)(findingthatCustoms ruling 
letters do not rise to the level of Chevron deference). 
121. SAS Inst Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1358 (2018) ("Even under Chevron, we owe 
an agency's interpretation of the law no deference unless, after 'employing traditional tools of 
statutory construction,' we find ourselves unable to discern Congress's meaning." (quoting 
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984))). 
122. Supra Part II.B-F. 
123. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. 
2018) THE SCOPE OF IPR £STOPPEL 1155 
H. Impact ofLegislative History 
Some patent stakeholders disagree with the narrow reading presented 
here, arguing that the provision should be read broadly because 
congressional records suggest that Congress and testifying stakeholders 
intended a broad reading of the provision. 124 However, this approach fails 
to conform to the Supreme Court's current textualist method of statutory 
interpretation. As explained above, constitutional principles of 
bicameralism and presentment demand that the text of the statute itself, 
rather than Congress's unenacted intentions, be the authoritative source 
of statutory interpretation. 125 Although courts sometimes use legislative 
history to confirm a reading arrived at via a textualist approach, courts 
may not use legislative history to contradict the clear text of a statute. 126 
Even if a court determines that legislative intent should influence the 
interpretation of a law, it should be cautious of using legislative history, 
rather than the text itself, to infer that intent. Legislative history is an 
imperfect measure of the intent behind the law for many reasons: 
Statements made in debates may be merely strategic and may not. 
represent the views of all of those passing the legislation, and even· 
committee reports speak, at best, for the committee's majority, rather than 
for the majority of legislators who voted for the legislation. 127 In 
124. E.g., Robert L. Stoll, Maintaining Post-Grant Review Estoppel in the American Invents 
Act Revisited: A Cal/for Legislative Restraint, 23 FED. CIR. B.J. 15, 53 (2013) (arguing for a broad 
scope of estoppel that would extend to any grounds that reasonably could have been raised in the 
petition for review). See infra Part IV.C for a discussion ofthe legislative history. 
125. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005) ("[T]he. 
authoritative statement is the statutory text, not the legislative history or any other extrinsic 
material"); Easterbrook, supra note 51, at 82 ("Intents are irrelevant even if discemable (which 
they aren't), because our Constitution provides for the enactment and approval of texts, not of 
intents. The text is not evidence of the law; it is the law."). 
126. See Milner v. Dep't ofNavy, 562 U.S. 562, 574 (2011) ("Legislative history, for those 
who take it into account, is meant to clear up ambiguity, not create it."); Easterbrook, supra note 
51, at 81 ("[Supreme Court Justices] never use legislative history to contradict a statute but 
sometimes use it to confirm statutory meaning arrived at, they tell us, by other means."). What 
purpose a confirmation of a meaning already decided may serve beyond satisfying intellectual 
curiosity is unclear. Under an appropriate textualist methodology, courts would not use legislative 
history even for the purposes of parsing ambiguities or confirming a meaning arrived at by other 
means. 
127. See Allapattah Servs., 545 U.S. at 568 ("[J]udicial reliance on legislative materials like 
committee reports, which are not themselves subject to the requirements of Article I, may give 
unrepresentative committee members---or, worse yet, unelected staffers and lobbyists-both the 
power and the incentive to attempt strategic manipulations of legislative history to secure results 
they were unable to achieve through the statutory text."); SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 45, at 
376-77 (noting that floor statements are often delivered to a nearly empty chamber, sometime 
solely for the purpose of "mak[ing] legislative history") ("[T]he only thing that one can say for 
sure was agreed to by both houses and the President (on signing the bill) is the text of the statute. 
The rest is legal fiction."); Easterbrook, supra note 51, at 81, 90-91, 94-96 (criticizing the practice 
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legislative history, "the median legislator is silent."128 In contrast, the text 
speaks for all who passed the legislation. 
Some recent cases state that legislative history might have value, at 
the periphery, to aid understanding of ambiguous terms. 129 Indeed, even 
under a true textualist approach, legislative history may have value in 
deducing the contemporaneous meaning of ambiguous terms, the 
meaning of which cannot be deduced from the text itself-not because 
the legislature's understanding determines the meaning of ambiguous 
terms, but because legislators are themselves members of the 
contemporaneous population and their contemporaneous statements are 
extrinsic evidence ofcontemporary understanding. 130 Even so, legislative 
history is often not the best source of the meaning of terms as they were 
understood by the contemporaneous interpretive community. For modem 
texts, a plethora of contemporaneous dictionaries are available to 
determine the unbiased, ordinary meaning of terms. Use of legislative 
history as evidence of contemporaneous understanding is dangerous 
when other sources are available because it invites conflation of the 
legislator's intended meaning with the actual contemporaneous meaning 
ofthose terms. Therefore, legislative history should generally not be used 
over dictionaries and other less prejudicial evidence to determine the 
meaning of terms in recently-passed statutes. For those statutes, like the 
AIA, the potential benefits of using legislative history as a proxy for 
contemporaneous understanding are sufficiently low that they do not 
outweigh the risk of conflating legislators' intended meaning with 
contemporaneous understanding. 
Admittedly, the legislative history of the AIA reflects that for IPR 
(though not for PGR or CBMR), at least those outspoken members of 
Congress who discussed the issue ofestoppel on the floor or in committee 
of "quot[ing] freely from legislators who favored [a particular approach to the legislation], or at 
least were neutral, whether or not that person had any influence" on the ultimate text of the 
legislation and noting the extensive time commitment that would be required of judges to 
adequately determine which statements reflect influence in the passage of the legislation and 
which do not); see also Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton, 137 S. Ct 1652, 1661 (2017) 
(referring to "excerpts from committee hearings and scattered floor statements by individual 
lawmakers" as "lowly sources" that are "among the least illuminating forms of legislative 
history"). 
128. Easterbrook, supra note 51, at 91. 
129. Milner, 562 U.S. at 572 ("Those of us who make use of legislative history believe that 
clear evidence of congressional intent may illuminate ambiguous text. We will not take the 
opposite tack of allowing ambiguous legislative history to muddy clear statutory language."); 
Allapattah Servs., 545 U.S. at 568 ("Extrinsic materials have a role in statutory interpretation only 
to the extent they shed a reliable light on the enacting Legislature's understanding of otherwise 
ambiguous terms."). 
130. See Easterbrook, supra note 51, at 91-92 ("Meaning depends not on the contents of the 
speaker's head, but on the reaction of the contemporaneous interpretive community."). 
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reports intended a broad estoppel that extended to grounds that 
reasonably could have been included in the petition for review. 131 The 
legislative history of the AIA's estoppel provisions is described further 
below in detail. 132 However, under the Supreme Court's current textualist 
approach to statutory interpretation, this legislative intent cannot alter the 
plain meaning of the statute derived from its text. 133 Constitutional 
principles demand that Congress execute its intent through the text. 134 If 
Congress intended a broad estoppel, the drafters of the AIA failed to 
accomplish this. It is now for Congress, not the courts, to correct the AIA 
via statutory amendment if it still believes it appropriate. 
I. Impact ofPolicy Arguments 
Principles of statutory interpretation likewise caution against reading 
a law to satisfy policy goals when the plain meaning of the statute 
supports a different reading. 135 In addition to the constitutional issues 
raised above, judges are less equipped than the legislature to determine 
the likely impact of particular interpretations of law and to choose from 
among the policy goals that should be served. Although Congress may 
hear commentary from diverse stakeholders as to how the laws will affect 
them or request social science or economics studies and await their results 
before acting, a judge often has far more limited information available 
and may, in the worst case, substitute her own reasoning for careful policy 
decisions on issues covered by statute. The judiciary is not designed for 
policy making on issues where Congress has already acted, but for 
interpreting laws according to the laws' terms. 136 
Under a textualist framework, pragmatism should have no role in the 
sound construction of statutory provisions, whether favorable to a 
textualist interpretation or not. Nonetheless, for completeness, the policy 
implications ofcompeting interpretations ofthe AIA' s estoppel provision 
are discussed in detail below in Part V. As described there, a narrow scope 
of estoppel furthers the patent quality goals that formed the primary 
impetus for passage of the AIA. 
131. !~a Part IV.C. 
132. Infra Part IV.C. 
133. Milner, 562 U.S. at 574; Allapattah Servs., 545 U.S. at 568. 
134. Supra Part II.A. I. 
135. Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 526 (1987) (per curiam) ("Deciding what 
competing values will or will not be sacrificed to the achievement of a particular objective is the 
very essence of legislative choice-and it frustrates rather than effectuates legislative intent 
simplistically to assume that whatever furthers the statute's primary objective must be the law."); 
see also SAS Inst. Inc. v. lancu, 138 S. Ct 1348, 1358 (2018) ("Policy arguments are properly 
addressed to Congress, not this Court."). 
136. See Easterbrook, supra note 51, at 82 ("I am leery ofpragmatic arguments because they 
simultaneously depart from the enacted texts and give too much power to judges."). 
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As explained above, the Supreme Court's modem, textualist approach 
to statutory construction demands a narrow reading ofthe AIA' s statutory 
estoppel provisions. Under this reading, a petitioner would not be 
estopped from raising, in later litigation, any grounds for invalidity that 
it could not litigate during the pendency of the post-grant proceeding, 
either because the PTAB declined institution for any reason or because 
the petitioner chose not to include the ground in its petition for review. 
This Article now turns to the current judicial approach to IPR estoppel 
before discussing, for the sake of completeness, the considerations that 
do not apply to this textualist approach to statutory interpretation, namely 
the legislative history of the AIA's estoppel provisions and the policy 
justifications of a narrow estoppel following post-grant proceedings. 
III. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF POST-GRANT ESTOPPEL 
The Federal Circuit has not yet had occasion to address, in a 
precedential decision, how the AIA' s estoppel provisions should be read 
when applied to grounds that the petitioner reasonably could have raised 
in its petition for IPR, PGR, or CBMR but did not. The Supreme Court 
likewise has not addressed this issue. In light of the foregoing statutory 
analysis, when the Federal Circuit or the Supreme Court next reviews the 
appropriate scope of the AIA' s estoppel provisions, it should adopt a 
narrow reading. Although the Federal Circuit adopted a narrow reading 
of the statutory text in pre-SAS Industries cases involving the estoppel 
effect of non-instituted grounds, such as Shaw Industries Group, Inc. v. 
Automated Creel Systems, Inc. 137 and HP Inc. v. MPHJ Technology 
Investments, LLC, 138 some district courts and the PT AB found that those 
decisions merely stood for a limited exception to estoppel if the PTAB 
decliries review of certain grounds for redundancy (without substantive 
consideration) and grants partial institution to others. 139 Following the 
Supreme Court's decision in SAS Industries, which requires the PT AB to 
institute review on all grounds raised in the petition or none, 140 the 
specific factual scenarios addressed in Shaw and HP can no longer arise. 
137. 817 F.3d 1293, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 374 (2016). 
138. 817 F.3d 1339, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
139. E.g., Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp. v. Snap-On Inc., 271 F. Supp. 3d 990, 1033 (E.D. 
Wis. 2017); Cobalt Boats, LLC v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc., No. 2:15-CV-00021-HCM-LRL, 2017 
WL 2605977 at *2-3 (E.D. Va June 5, 2017); Douglas Dynamics, LLC v. Meyer Prods. LLC, 
No. 14-cv-886-jdp, 2017 WL 1382556, at *4 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 18, 2017); Great W. Cas. Co. v. 
Intellectual Ventures II LLC, No. IPR2016-01534, at 12 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 15, 2017). A "ground" 
in PTAB practice refers to a basis for unpatentability, such as obviousness over a specific 
combination ofprior art. A petition for review may include multiple grounds for unpatentability. 
140. SAS Inst. Inc., 138 S. Ct. at 135~0. 
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Nonetheless, this and other precedent on the estoppel effect of non­
instituted grounds remains informative in the interpretation of the 
appropriate scope of the AIA's estoppel provisions. 
A. The Federal Circuit 
In Shaw Industries, petitioner Shaw sought a writ of mandamus 
instructing the PTAB to reevaluate a decision not to institute review on 
certain grounds for unpatentability on the basis that those grounds were 
redundant with other instituted grounds. 141 Shaw argued for mandamus 
on the basis that, "because it brought the Payne-based ground in its 
petition and the PTO denied IPR on that ground, it may be estopped from 
arguing the ground in any future proceedings."142 The USPTO, in its 
opposing briefs, argued that under a plain reading of § 315( e )(2), "the 
denied ground never became part of the IPR."143 The Federal Circuit 
agreed with the USPTO, holding that, under a plain reading, the Payne­
based ground was not raised "during that inter partes review": 
Both parts of§ 315(e) create estoppel for arguments "on 
any ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably could 
have raised during that inter partes review." Shaw raised its 
Payne-based ground in its petition for IPR. [T]he PTO 
denied the petition as to that ground, thus no IPR was 
instituted on that ground. The IPR does not begin until it is 
instituted. See Cuozzo, 793 F.3d at 1272 ("IPRs proceed in 
two phases. In the first phase, the PTO determines whether 
to institute IPR. In the second phase, the Board conducts the 
IPR proceeding and issues a final decision." (citations 
omitted)). Thus, Shaw did not raise-nor could it have 
reasonably raised-the Payne-based ground during the IPR. 
The plain language of the statute prohibits the application of 
estoppel under these circumstances. 144 
Shortly after Shaw, the Federal Circuit again held in HP that estoppel 
does not apply to grounds that the petitioner raised but that the PT AB did 
not institute as part of the IPR on the basis of redundancy. 145 Together, 
these cases at least made clear that when the PT AB declines to institute 
141. Shaw, 817 F.3d at 1299. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. at 1300 (quoting Brief for Intervenor-Dir. of the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office 
at 38, Shaw, 817 F.3d 1293 (No. 15-1116)). 
144. Id. 
145. HP Inc. v. MPHJ Tech. Inv., LLC, 817 F.3d 1339, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ("[l]he 
noninstituted grounds do not become a part of the IPR. Accordingly, the noninstituted grounds 
were not raised and, as review was denied, could not be raised in the IPR. Therefore, the estoppel 
provisions of§ 315(e)(l) do not apply."). 
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review ofgrounds raised in the petition on the basis ofredundancy, rather 
than on a substantive basis, estoppel does not extend to those grounds. 
Hinting at possible extension of this logic, in early 2017, the Federal 
Circuit issued a nonprecedential opinion denying a petition for 
mandamus in In re Verinata Health. 146 The court found no clear abuse of 
discretion in the lower court's findings: (1) estoppel does not apply to 
grounds raised in the petition, but on which the Board declined to institute 
review for substaritive reasons (because it found there was no likelihood 
of success on those grounds); and (2) estoppel does apply to grounds that 
are merely a subset of instituted obviousness combinations. 147 
Additionally, consistent with statutory language that estoppel applies 
only where "a claim in a patent under this chapter ... results in a final 
written decision,"148 the Federal Circuit has held that estoppel does not 
apply to grounds for invalidity ofa patent claim where the PT AB declines 
to institute review of the claim on any wound and thus does not address 
that claim in its final written decision. 1 9 
Another Federal Circuit case that supports a narrow definition of 
"review" or "proceeding" in the AIA's estoppel provisions is Intellectual 
Ventures II v. JPMorgan Chase & Co. 150 At issue in that case was the 
scope of the Federal Circuit's appellate jurisdiction pursuant to AlA § 
18(b ), which provides for "immediate interlocutory appeal from a district 
court's decision" to stay district court proceedings "relating to a 
transitional [CBMR] proceeding for that patent."151 The Federal Circuit 
held that the word "proceeding" in this statutory provision only refers to 
the period following institution and does not permit appeal from a stay 
decision relating only to a petition for a CBMR proceeding. 152 Looking 
to the statutory context, the Federal Circuit noted that the "AIA 
differentiates between a petition for a CBMR proceeding" and the 
proceeding itself, such as in the phrase "petition for a [CBMR] 
146. No. 17-109, 2017 WL 1422489 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 9, 2017), writ denied, Verinata Health, 
Inc. v. AriosaDiagnostics, Inc, No. 12-CV-05501-SI, 2017 WL 235048 (N.D. Cal.Jan. 19, 2017). 
147. See id. at *2. 
148. 35 U.S.C. § 315(e) (2012). 
149. Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Servs., 859 F.3d 1044, 1052-53 (Fed. Cir. 2017) 
(holding that the PTAB institutes review "on a claim-by-claim basis," such that where the PTAB 
declined to institute review of certain claims in a CBMR, "estoppel does not apply to those non­
instituted claims," even though § 101 grounds for invalidity were raised with respect to both the 
instituted and non-instituted claims); see also Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 814 F.3d 
1309, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ("[T]he statute is quite clear that the PTO can choose whether to"' 
institute inter partes review on a claim-by-claim basis."), overruled on other grounds by Aqua 
Prod., Inc. v. Mata!, 872 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
150. 781F.3d1372 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
151. Id. at 1375 (emphasisadded)(footnoteomitted)(quotingAIA, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 
sec. 18(b) 125 Stat. 284, 331 (2011) (codified as amended in scattered sections of35 U.S.C.)). 
152. Id. at 1376 (alteration in original) (quoting AlA sec. 18(a)(l)(B)). 
1161 2018) THR SCOPE OF IPR ESTOPPEL 
proceeding," which the Federal Circuit said suggests that the petition is a 
request for a proceeding, not part of the proceeding. 153 Ifthe logic ofthis 
case were applied to the estoppel provisions, the phrase "during 
that ... review," and certainly the phrase "during that transitional 
proceeding," could only be read as referring to the time period following 
institution. 
B. PTAB 
The PT AB has interpreted Shaw as holding that no statutory estoppel 
applies where the petitioner raised the ground in its petition but the PT AB 
granted only partial institution and declined to institute review on that 
ground, either on the basis of redundancy or for substantive reasons.154 
However, both before and after Shaw, the PTAB has taken a broad view 
ofestoppel as to grounds that the petitioner failed to include in its petition 
for review. 155 Adopting Senator Kyl's approach, the PTAB will apply 
estoppel to any grounds that it finds the petitioner reasonably could have 
located through a diligent search and included in the petition for 
review. 156 For example, the PTAB has found that if a prior art reference 
was cited during prosecution or cited by the petitioner in earlier 
proceedings, the petitioner could have raised that ground in its petition 
for review and would be estopped from raising it in later proceedings. 157 
For grounds not previously cited, the PTAB conducts an assessment of 
the availability of the materials to determine whether they could 
153. Id. 
154. Great W. Cas. Co. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLC, No. IPR2016-01534, at 12-13 
(P.T.A.B. Feb. 15, 2017) (discerning "that Shaw Industries Group held that estoppel does not 
apply to any ground ofunpatentability that was presented in a petition, but denied institution," but 
noting that there is "a substantive distinction between a ground that a petitioner attempted to raise, 
but was denied a trial, and a ground that a petitioner could have raised, but elected not to raise in 
its previous petition or petitions"). 
155. Apotex Inc. v. Wyeth LLC, No. IPR2015-00873, at 8 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 16, 2015); Johns 
Manville Corp. v. Knauf Insulation [nc., No. IPR2016-00130, at 12-15 (P.T.A.B. May 8, 2017); 
Great West Cas., No. IPR2016-01534, at 15-16; Ford Motor Co. v. Paice, No. IPR2015-00722, 
at 6--8 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 26, 2016); Praxair Distribution Inc. v. INO Therapeutics LLC., No. 
IPR2016-00781, at 10 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 25, 2016). The practical effects of the PTAB's approach 
to estoppel may be limited, however. In SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu, the Supreme Court indicated 
that the AIA gives the USPTO discretion to deny institution of an inter partes review. 138 S. Ct. 
1348, 1351 (2018) ("§ 314(a) invests the Director with discretion on the question whether to 
institute review ....")(emphasis in original). Combined with the unappealability of institution 
decisions, 35 U.S.C. § 314(d), there is little to stop the PTAB from simply denying institution in 
any circumstance it pleases. 
156. See, e.g., Johns Manville Corp., No. IPR2016-00130, at 12-15; Great West Cas., No. 
IPR2016-01534, at 15-16 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 15, 2017); Ford Motor, No. IPR2015-00722, at 6--8; 
Praxair Distribution Inc., No. lPR2016-00781, at 10; Apotex, No. IPR2015-00873, at 8. 
157. Ford Motor, No. IPR2015-00722, at 6--8; Apotex, No. IPR2015-00873, at 8. 
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reasonably have been found. 158 The approach fails to comport with sound 
principles of statutory construction and adds unnecessary complexity to 
the decision of whether to apply estoppel. 
C. District Courts 
District courts are split in their interpretation of the AIA's estoppel 
provisions, particularly as to whether a petitioner is estopped from raising 
art that it could have, but did not, raise in its petition for review. 
1. Non-Instituted Grounds Raised in Petition 
After Shaw, and before SAS Industries prohibited partial institution, 
most district courts held that estoppel did not apply as to grounds that 
were raised in the petition but not instituted, regardless of whether the 
PTAB declined to institute on redundancy grounds 159 or because the 
PTAB believed the ground was not reasonably likely to succeed. 160 
Moreover, courts agree that estoppel does not apply to any grounds for 
invalidity of a patent claim where the PT AB declines to institute on any 
grounds for that claim. 161 
Nonetheless, a few district courts that disagree with Shaw's approach 
to interpreting statutory estoppel have found a way around it. When 
determining whether to stay court proceedings pending the results ofIPRs 
and PGRs, some courts have required parties to stipulate, as a condition 
of the stay, to a broader scope of estoppel than that likely appropriate 
under Shaw. 162 For example, in a recent case in the Eastern District of 
Texas, the court suggested that it would only stay the case pending an 
IPR ifthe defendant, who was the IPR petitioner, "stipulates that for any 
claims surviving IPR, [it] will not assert a defense under§§ 102 or 103 
based on prior art that it raised or reasonably could have raised in its IPR 
petitions," noting that '"reasonably could have raised' would be prior art 
158. Johns Manville, No. IPR2016-00130, at 12-15; Great West Cas., No. IPR2016-01534, 
at 15-16; Praxair Distribution Inc., No. IPR2016-00781, at 10. 
159. Illumina Inc. v. Qiagen N.V., 207 F. Supp. 3d 1081, 1088-89 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (finding 
no estoppel applies to grounds not instituted as redundant). 
160. Verinata Health, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc, No. 12-CV-05501-SI, 2017 WL 
235048, at *3-4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2017) (finding estoppel did not apply to obviousness over a 
combination ofQuake and Craig, a ground on which the PTAB declined to institute review as not 
reasonably likely to succeed). 
161. Depomed Inc. v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 3:13-cv-00571, 2017 WL 5508538, at *16­
18 (D.N.J. Nov. 4, 2016) (finding that the defendant was not estopped from challenging non­
instituted claims on the basis of prior art asserted in the IPR petition). This comports with the 
statutory language, wherein estoppel only applies if there is an "inter partes review ofa claim in 
a patent under this chapter that results in a final written decision." 35 U.S.C. § 315(e). 
162. E.g., Infernal Tech., LLC v. Elec. Arts Inc., No. 215CV01523JRGRSP, 2016 WL 
9000458, at *4, *4 n.5 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 21, 2016). 
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that a 'skilled searcher conducting a diligent search reasonably could 
have been expected to discover'" and that this would "includ[ e] any 
applicable references cited in [its] invalidity contentions or relied upon 
by [its] exgert witness in his opening expert report regarding 
invalidity."1 The court then deferred resolution of the motion to stay 
pending defendant's "decision" on whether to enter the requested 
stipulation. 164 A court offering such a deal wields immense power over 
the defendant, which the court uses to usurp the precedent of higher 
courts and thereby harm the orderly administration ofjustice. Such deals 
are likely to continue to rise in popularity absent a crystal-clear decision 
on the scope of estoppel from the Federal Circuit, an aberrant appellate 
review of a denial of stay should a party refuse such a deal, 165 or 
legislative action to clarify the conditions of stay pending IPR and PGR 
and provide direct appellate review of those decisions, as the statute 
provides for CBMR. 16 
2. Grounds Not Raised in Petition 
District courts are fiercely split, however, in their interpretation of the 
AIA's estoppel provisions as applied to grounds for invalidity that the 
petitioner did not raise in its petition for review. Some lower courts have 
read into the estoppel provision language that does not exist in its text, 
finding that the estoppel applies to grounds that were raised or reasonably 
could have been raised in the party's petition for IPR or PGR, including 
art that the petitioner reasonably could have located after a diligent 
search. 167 Relying primarily on legislative history to determine the 
163. Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting 157 CONG. REc. Sl375 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) 
(statement of Sen. Ky!)). 
164. Id. at *l. 
165. Ordinarily, a district court's decision of whether to grant a stay is not appealable. See 
Procter & Gamble Co. v. Kraft Foods Glob., Inc., 549 F.3d 842, 847 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (explaining 
a limited exception where appellate review of a decision to stay may be appropriate where other 
interlocutory orders that are properly appealed necessarily implicate the stay decision and 
providing that such review is for an abuse of discretion). 
166. For CBMR only, the AIA sets out factors that a court must consider whether deciding 
whether to enter a stay, provides for immediate interlocutory review of the stay decision, and 
provides that such review may be de novo. AJA, Pub. L. No. 112-29, sec. 18(b )(1 ), 125 Stat. 284, 
331 (2011) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). The Federal Circuit, 
interpreting this statute, recently overturned a district court's decision to deny a stay in a CBMR, 
finding, inter alia, that the PT AB 's decision to institute review on all claims of the asserted patent 
"strongly favor[s] ... a stay." Virtua!Agility Inc. v. Salesforce.com, Inc., 759 F.3d 1307, 1313 
(Fed. Cir. 2014). 
167. Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp. v. Snap-On Inc., 271 F. Supp. 3d 990, 1033 (E.D. Wis. 
2017); Network-I Techs., Inc. v. Alcatel-Lucent USA, Inc., No. 6:1 l-CV-00492-RWS, 2017 WL 
4856473, at *l (E.D. Tex. Oct. 27, 2017) ("The statute provides that a party is estopped from 
asserting at trial invalidity grounds that it reasonably could have raised during an IPR, and non­
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appropriate scope of the estoppel provision, these cases fail to give 
sufficient weifiht to the text of the statute and the context in which its 
words appear. 68 
On the other hand, several other district courts have read Shaw as 
limiting estoppel only to those grounds that were raised in the petition, 
instituted, and subject to a written decision. 169 These courts recognize that 
Shaw 's textualist approach demands a narrow reading. 170 Some of these 
courts have also noted the absurdity, given the space constraints ofPTAB 
petitions, of requiring a petitioner to include all prior art it could have 
located in its petition for IPR under risk of estoppel. 171 
petitioned grounds that could have been included in an IPR petition are precisely those grounds."}; 
Cobalt Boats, LLC, v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc., No. 2:15-CV-00021-HCM-LRL, 2017 WL 2605977 
at *5-6 (E.D. Va June 5, 2017); Biscotti Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 13-CV-01015-JRG-RSP, 
2017WL2526231, at •7 (E.D. Tex. May 11, 2017) (determining that estoppel applies to grounds 
not included in a petition that the petitioner reasonably could have raised); Douglas Dynamics, 
LLC v. Meyer Prods. LLC, No. 14-cv-886-jdp, 2017 WL 1382556, at •4 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 18, 
2017) ("Accordingly, the court will construe the statutory language 'any ground that the 
petitioner ... reasonably could have raised during that inter partes review' to include non­
petitioned grounds that the defendant chose not to present in its petition to PTAB [and could have 
found via a diligent search]." (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 316(e)(2) (2012)), reconsideration granted on 
other grounds, No. 14-CV-886-JDP, 2017 WL 2116714 (W.D. Wis. May 15, 2017); Parallel 
Networks Licensing, LLC v. IBM Corp., No. 13-2072, 2017 WL 1045912, at •11-12 (D. Del. 
Feb. 22, 2017), appeal filed, No. 17-2115 (Fed. Cir. May 31, 2017); Clearlamp, LLC v. LKQ 
Corp., No. 12 C 2533, 2016 WL 4734389, at *7-8 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 18, 2016). 
168. Milwaukee E/ec. Tool Corp., 271 F. Supp. 3d at 1033; Network-I Techs., 2017 WL 
4856473, at *l; Cobalt Boats, 2017 WL 2605977, at *5--6; Biscotti Inc., 2017 WL 2526231, at 
*7 (determining that estoppel applies to grounds not included in a petition that the petitioner 
reasonably could have raised); Douglas Dynamics, 2017 WL 1382556, at *4; Parallel Networks 
Licensing, 2017 WL 1045912, at *11-12; Clear/amp, 2016 WL 4734389, at •7-8. Though, at 
least one court arrived at this result using a purportedly text-based analysis. Oil-Dri Corp. ofAm. 
v. Nestle PurinaPetcare Co., No. 15-CV-1067, 2017 WL 3278915, at •7 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 2, 2017). 
169. Koninklijke Philips N.V. v. Wangs All. Corp., No. CV 14-12298-DJC, 2018 WL 
283893, at •4 (D. Mass. Jan. 2, 2018) ("[T]he broader reading of the estoppel provision is 
foreclosed by Shaw."); Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., LLC, No. 15-CV-03295-BLF, 2017 WL 
7050646, at •11 (N.D. Cal. July 28, 2017) ("[E]stoppel applies only to grounds that were both 
raised in the IPR petition and instituted in the IPR proceeding."); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. 
Toshiba Corp., 221 F. Supp. 3d 534, 553-54 (D. Del. 2016) ("Although ... Toshiba certainly 
could have raised these additional obviousness grounds based on public documents at the outset 
of their IPR petition, the Federal Circuit has construed the above language quite literally."), 
reconsideration denied, 2017 WL 107980, at *1 (D. Del. Jan. 11, 2017). 
170. See Konink/ijke Philips N. V., 2018 WL 283893, at *4; Finjan, 2017 WL 7050646, at 
*11; Intellectual Ventures, 221 F. Supp. at 553-54. 
171. Intellectual Ventures, 2017 WL 107980, at *l (denying reconsideration and noting, as 
to grounds not raised in the IPR petition, that the argument that "a company that seeks an IPR 
must bring to the PTAB's attention every ground the company has reason to think might be 
relevant[,] otherwise, it will be estopped from pursuing that ground in litigation ... appears to be 
inconsistent with all ofthe limitations imposed by the PTAB on IPR proceedings (e.g., page limits 
for petitions, 14 point type, and portrait-view claim charts)"). 
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3. Other 
District courts agree that estoppel does not apply to combinations of 
art that include prior art systems that were in public use or on sale, which 
could not have been raised in the IPRs 9iven that IPRs are limited by 
statute to patents or printed publications. 1 2 
Most district courts agree that estoppel extends to grounds that are 
merely a subset of instituted grounds because such subsets "reasonably 
could have been raised" during the IPR. 173 However, at least one court 
has held otherwise when the PT AB explicitly noted that it would not 
consider the subset in the review. 174 
IV. 	STATUTORY AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF PRE-AlA AND AlA 
ESTOPPEL PROVISIONS 
A. Bayh-Dole and the AIPA 
The relevant history of the AIA's post-grant proceedings begins with 
the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980.175 Through passage of the Bayh-Dole Act of 
1980, Congress amended the Patent Act to allow ex parte reexamination 
of issued patents. 176 Ex parte reexaminations permit a patent owner or a 
third party to ask the Patent Office to reexamine an already-issued patent 
on the basis of a substantial new question ofpatentability, such as certain 
prior art that was not previously considered by the Patent Office. 177 
Congress's stated goals in enacting ex parte reexamination were to 
improve patent quality-to "strengthenO investor confidence in the 
certainty of patent rights by creating a system of administrative 
reexamination of doubtful patents"-and to provide a faster and less 
expensive means to test patent validity than doing so only through district 
court litigation. 178 Ex parte proceedings, as the name conveys, involve 
172. 35 U.S.C. § 31 l(b); cf Advanced Micro Devices v. LG Elecs., Inc., No. 14-cv-01012­
SI, 2017 WL 2774339, at *6 (noting that "IPR estoppel does not effect a bar to LG's assertion of 
all combinations including Kurihara," only combinations that were instituted and subsets thereof). 
173. E.g., Verinata Health, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc, No. 12-CV-05501-SI, 2017 WL 
235048, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2017). 
174. Oil-Ori Corp. of Am. v. Nestle Purina Petcare Co., No. 15-CV-1067, 2017 WL 
3278915, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 2, 2017). 
175. Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980) (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 301-307). 
176. Id. 
177. Id.; U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE 
§ 2216 (9th ed. 2015) [hereinafter MPEP]. 
178. H.R. REP. No. 96-1307, pt. 1, at 6462 (1980). The Report of the House Committee on 
the Judiciary notes hope that this procedure might function as an alternative to litigating validity 
in court but focuses on potential benefits to the patentee, such as that the procedure potentially 
allowing patentees to demonstrate the validity of their patents to third party infiingers who would 
otherwise use the high cost of litigation as leverage to extract cheaper licensing fees. Id. ("A new 
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only the Patent Office and the patentee, with the third party having no 
ability to participate beyond filing an initial request or, in certain limited 
circumstances, a single reply. 179 
The drafters of the Bayh-Dole Act included no estoppel provision 
binding third parties to the validity decisions of the Patent Office 
following ex parte reexamination. 180 Nonetheless, parties might have had 
more difficulty challenging a patent in court following an unsuccessful 
ex parte reexamination. Although the evidentiary burden does not 
change, the presumption of validity afforded to patents under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 282 may be more difficult to overcome where the grounds for invalidity 
were considered by the Patent Office, either during the original 
examination or reexamination, than if those grounds were not previously 
considered. 181 In the years following implementation of ex parte 
reexamination, some patent stakeholders called for expanding the role of 
third-party challengers in reexamination proceedings on the grounds that 
patent reexamination procedure is needed to permit the owner of a patent to have the validity of 
his patent tested in the Patent office where the most expert opinions exist and at a much reduced 
cost. Patent office reexamination will greatly reduce, if not end, the threat of legal costs being 
used to 'blackmail' such holders into allowing patent infringements or being forced to license 
their patents for nominal fees. . . . It is anticipated that these measures provide a useful and 
necessary alternative for challengers and for patent owners to test the validity of United States 
patents in an efficient and relatively inexpensive manner."). 
179. See MPEP, supra note 177, § 2209 ("Ifordered, the actual reexamination proceeding is 
ex parte in nature."). The third party may reply if the patentee files an opposition statement, 
though the patentee rarely does so. See 35 U.S.C. § 304 (2012) ("[T]hat person [who filed the 
request] may file and have considered in the reexamination a reply to any statement filed by the 
patent owner."); 37 C.F.R. § 1.550(g) (2017) ("The active participation of the ex parte 
reexamination requester ends with the reply pursuant to § 1.535, and no further submissions on 
behalf of the reexamination requester will be acknowledged or considered."). 
180. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 301-307. Note that common law estoppel would generally not apply 
following ex parte administrative proceedings because the party to be estopped would have had 
no full and fair opportunity to litigate. See United States v. Utah Const. & Min. Co., 384 U.S. 394, 
422 (1966) (noting in dicta that preclusion would only apply to agency decisions in "which the 
parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate"); cf In re Swanson, 540 F.3d 1368, 1379 
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (noting that because USPTO reexaminations and district court litigations on the 
validity of the same patent are "differing proceedings with different evidentiary standards for 
validity," they are "not duplicative"). 
181. Cf Microsoft Corp. v. 141 Ltd. P'ship, 564 U.S. 91, 111 (2011) (noting that although 
the presumption of validity requires invalidity to be shown by the same standard of ckar and 
convincing evidence in all infringement cases, "if the PTO did not have all material facts before 
it, its considered judgment may lose significant force. And, concomitantly, the challenger's 
burden to persuade the jury of its invalidity defense by clear and convincing evidence may be 
easier to sustain." (citations omitted)). The presumption ofvalidity does not apply within USPTO 
proceedings. MPEP, supra note 177, § 2258 ("The statutory presumption of validity, 35 U.S.C. 
282, has no application in reexamination."). 
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an expanded reexamination might be viewed as a more viable alternative 
to litigation than the then-existing ex parte procedure. 182 
With the American Inventors Protection Act of 1999 (AIPA),183 
Congress created a new post-grant procedure, inter partes reexamination, 
with the goal to expand third party participation in reexaminations. 184 
With inter partes reexamination, third parties could submit a written 
comment each time the patent owner filed a response, and they also had 
the opportunity to appeal a decision that the patent was not unpatentable 
to the US PTO' s Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, then to the 
Federal Circuit. 185 Congress also added a provision for estoppel wherein 
the petitioner would be estopped from asserting in a later proceeding any 
grounds for invalidity that the petitioner "raised or could have raised 
during the inter partes reexamination proceedings": 
CIVIL ACTION.-A third-party requester whose 
request for an inter partes reexamination results in an order 
under section 313 is estopped from asserting at a later time, 
in any civil action arising in whole or in part under section 
1338 of title 28, United States Code, the invalidity of any 
claim finally determined to be valid and patentable on any 
ground which the third-party requester raised or could have 
raised during the inter partes reexamination proceedings. 
This subsection does not prevent the assertion of invalidity 
based on newly discovered prior art unavailable to the third­
party requester and the Patent and Trademark Office at the 
time of the inter partes reexamination proceedings.186 
The legislative history indicates that Congress added this provision 
"[t]o prevent harassment" of patentees. 187 The AIPA also separately 
provided for estoppel of any fact determined during the reexamination: 
"Any party who requests an inter partes reexamination under section 311 
of title 35, United States Code, is estopped from challenging at a later 
182. See, e.g., ADVISORY COMM'N ON PATENT LAW REFORM, A REPORT TO THE SECRETARY 
OF COMMERCE 14 (1992) ("The Commission also recommends providing third parties with more 
opportunities for substantive participation during the reexamination proceeding. The objective of 
the Commission in this regard is to build confidence in the reexamination process so that third 
parties will be inclined to raise patent challenges in this forum rather than through litigation."). 
183. Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501A-552 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of35 U.S.C.). 
184. H.R. REP. No. 106-287, pt 1, at 6 (1999). 
185. AIPA sec. 4605, § 134. 
186. AIPA sec. 4604, § 315(c) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) (2002)). 
187. H.R. REP. No. 106-287, pt. 1, at 56 (1999) ("To prevent harassment, third-party 
requesters who participate in a reexamination proceeding are estopped from raising in a 
subsequent court action or reexamination any issue of patent validity that they raised or could 
have raised during reexamination."). 
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time, in any civil action, any fact determined during the process of such 
reexamination ...." 188 
B. 2000-2010: Between the A/PA and the AJA 
Despite high hopes for the inter partes reexamination procedures 
established by the AIP A, litigants did not often use the process in its early 
years. 189 Commentary collected by the Patent Office reflected the largest 
hurdle to adoption: Potential challengers were unsure of estoppel's reach 
under the AIP A, and they were unwilling to risk potentially broad 
estoppel given the limited procedural scope of the review, especially 
where petitioners lacked the ability to engage in discovery and otherwise 
fully litigate the dispute. 190 In the early 2000s, the Patent Office began 
lobbying for an expanded post-grant review proceeding that would 
provide "a genuinely contested case presided over by panels of USPTO 
administrative patent judges." 191 
In 2003, the House Committee on the Judiciary considered a draft bill 
to remove "or could have raised" estoppel from inter partes 
reexamination provisions, 192 but it did not come to fruition. At the 
hearing, some stakeholders argued for retention of"or could have raised" 
estoppel on the grounds that a petitioner should not be permitted to harass 
a patentee with serial challenges based on information it could have 
included in prior reexamination requests. 193 Around this time, key patent 
188. AIPA sec. 4607 (uncodified). 
189. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, REPORT To CONGRESS ON INTER PARTES 
REEXAMINATION 5 (2004) ("Over the past five years, the USPTO has received over 1,600,000 
patent applications and issued almost 900,000 patents. Yet in the nearly five years that the 
procedure has been available, only 53 inter partes reexamination requests were filed."). 
190. Id. at 4, 6 (discussing comments received from stakeholders that the scope of the 
estoppel provision was unclear and "is the most frequently identified inequity that deters third 
parties from filing requests for inter partes reexamination ofpatents" and further noting that "the 
lack of such procedural mechanisms as discovery and cross-examination that would be available 
in litigation has apparently resulted in challengers being unwilling to invoke inter partes 
reexamination and risk its estoppel effect"). 
191. Id. at 8--9; accord U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 21 ST CENTURY STRATEGIC PLAN 
(submitted to Congress in Feb. 2002); Patent Quality Improvement: Post-Grant Opposition: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet & Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, l08th Cong. 5 (2004) [hereinafter 2004 House Hearing] (statement of James A. 
Toupin, General Counsel, USPTO). 
192. Patent Quality Improvement: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet & 
Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 7, 9 (2003) [hereinafter 2003 
House Hearing]. 
193. Id. at 9 (statement of AIPLA) ("We see no justification for a third party, who is aware 
of information, or who reasonably could have become aware of such information, not to base a 
reexamination request on all such information. This balance was struck to ensure that patentees 
of limited means would not be subject to harassment from serial challenges of a third party 
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stakeholders raised increasing alarm over what they perceived as a rise in 
the USPTO issuing patents that it should not have issued, and suggested 
more exhaustive adversarial post-grant proceedings as an efficient means 
to challenge these patents after issuance. 194 In 2004, the House 
Committee on the Judiciary held a hearing to consider creation of more 
complete post-grant proceedings. 195 At this hearing, stakeholders 
presented a variety of views on the appropriate scope of estoppel; some 
stakeholders argued that estoppel should apply to grounds raised during 
the proceeding and some argued for no statutory estoppel at all. 196 
Over the course of the next six years, new patent reform bills that 
would have created new, more complete post-grant proceedings were 
presented almost every year. 197 The estoppel provisions in those bills 
included language limiting estoppel to "any issue of fact or law actually 
decided by the panel and necessary to the determination of that issue" 198 
or to grounds "raised" during the review. 199 At hearings on the bills, many 
stakeholders, especially practicing entities, testified in favor of a narrow 
scope of estoppel.200 Several others, however, such as the USPTO and 
requestor based on information that the requestor could have submitted initially, and we believe 
it is a correct balance."). 
194. A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 3 (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004), 
https://www.nap.edu/catalog/10976/a-patent-system-for-the-21 st-century [https://permacc/ 
S2YW-LJDC] ("There are ... several reasons to suspect that more issued patents are substandard, 
particularly in technologies newly subject to patenting."); FED. TRADE CoMM'N, To PROMOTE 
INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 5 (2003), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/promote-innovation-proper-balance­
competition-and-patent-law-and-policy/innovationrpt.pdf (discussing stakeholder concerns that 
numerous patents that are likely invalid as obvious block commercialization of new innovations 
in certain technology areas such as software and biotech). 
195. 2004 House Hearing, supra note 191, at 2. 
196. E.g., id. at 14 (statement ofJeffrey Kushan on behalfofGenentech, Inc.) ("[W]e believe 
Congress should not attempt to create any special statutory estoppel provisions in any new 
system."); id. at 38 (statement of Karl Sun, Head of Patents, Google, Inc.) ("[E]stoppel arising 
from patent opposition should be limited to the grounds that are raised and addressed in the 
opposition."). 
197. E.g., H.R. 1260, 111 th Cong. (2009); S. 515, 111 th Cong. (2009); S. 3600, 110th Cong. 
(2008); S. 1145, 110th Cong. § 338(a) (2d Sess. 2008) (reported Jan. 24, 2008); H.R. 1908, I 10th 
Cong. (2d Sess. 2007) (introduced Apr. 18, 2007); H.R. 2795, 109th Cong.§ 1 (2005). 
198. H.R. 2795 § 1. 
199. H.R. 1260 §§ 334-335; S. 515; S. 1145 § 338(a); S. 3600, 1 lOth Cong.§ 322(d) (2008); 
H.R. 1908 § 334(a). 
200. Perspectives on Patents: Post- Grant Review Procedures and other Litigation Reforms: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop. ofthe S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 
5 (2006) (statement of Mark Chandler, Senior Vice President and General Counsel, Cisco 
Systems, Inc.); id. at 6 (statement of Phillip S. Johnson, Chief Patent Counsel, Johnson & 
Johnson); id. at 21 (statement of John R. Thomas, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law 
Center) ("I think the issue before you is whether we ought to encourage prompt patent challenges 
through the Draconian sanction ofdisallowing individuals from bringing them at all."). 
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universities, testified in favor of a broader scope of estoppel that would 
enable these proceedings to function as "a complete alternative to 
litigation."201 
C. The AJA 's Estoppel Provisions 
Committee reports on what became the AIA reflect a desire to 
transform the prior inter partes reexamination "from an examinational to 
an adjudicative proceeding" through the creation of IPR.202 In the course 
of adapting the statutory text for inter partes reexamination, Congress 
carried over much of the language of the estoppel provision applicable to 
inter partes reexamination to the estoppel provision applicable to IPR 
proceedings.203 Specifically, the petitioner in an IPR of a patent claim 
addressed in a final written decision would be barred from later raising 
any ground for invalidity "that the petitioner raised or"-with the new 
addition ofthe word "reasonably"-"reasonably could have raised during 
that inter partes review."204 Legislators found that they could not carry 
over the estoppel provision from inter partes reexamination to inter 
partes review without keeping the phrase "could have raised," given the 
objection of some patent owners to removing the now-entrenched 
language.205 
201. Patent Reform: The Future ofAmerican Innovation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 13 (2007) [hereinafter 2007 Senate Hearing] (statement ofJon Dudas, 
Director, USPTO) ("[T]he estoppel needs to be quite strong that says on the second window any 
issue that you raised or could have raised ... you can bring up no place else. That second window, 
from the administration's position, is intended to allow nothing-a complete alternative to 
litigation."); accord id. (statement of William T. Tucker, Executive Director, Research and 
Administration and Technology Transfer, University of California-Oakland). 
202. H.R. REP. No. 112-98, pt. 1, at 46(2011). 
203. Compare American Inventors Protection Act of 1990 (AJPA), Pub. L. No. 106-113, sec. 
4604, § 315(c), 113 Stat. 1501A-552, 1501A-569 with 35 U.S.C. § 315(e) (2012). 
204. See 35 U.S.C. § 315(e); AIPA sec. 4604, § 315(c). What meaning should courts derive 
from the addition ofthe word "reasonably" in the phrase "raised or reasonably could have raised"? 
Despite the principle against use of legislative history to derive meaning, courts often consider 
statutory history, finding that ifthe legislature amends a statute, a significant change in language 
when compared to the prior version of the statute can indicate a change in meaning. SCALIA & 
GARNER, supra note 45, at 256--60. Yet courts must determine whether the different words used 
truly have a different meaning and if that different meaning is relevant to the ambiguity being 
resolved. Here, though there is a difference between "reasonably could have raised" and "could 
have raised," any difference has no impact on whether estoppel should arise from events occurring 
prior to institution because both phrases are modified by "during that ... review." Id. 
205. See Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History ofthe America Invents Act: Part II of 
II, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 539, 616 (2011) (citing 2007 Senate Hearing, supra note 201, at 210 
(statement of Bruce Bernstein, Chief Intellectual Property and Licensing Officer, lnterDigital 
Communications Corp.); see also Patent Act of2005: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, 
the Internet & Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 26 (2005) 
(statement of Carl Gulbrandsen, Managing Director, Wisconsin Alumni Research Found.); 2003 
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In debates, some legislators argued that the scope of estoppel 
following IPRs should apply broadly. Senator Kyl stated that an IPR "will 
completely substitute for at least the patents-and-printed-publications 
portion of the civil litigation."206 Senator Kyl also proposed that the 
phrase "reasonably could have raised" means that estoppel extends to 
"prior art which a skilled researcher conducting a diligent search 
reasonably could have been expected to discover" in time to include in 
the petition for review. 207 However, the committee report's description of 
the estoppel provision essentially parroted the statutory text, providing 
no further guidance as to Congress's intended meaning. 208 
In contrast, the legislative history with respect to the PGR provisions 
makes clear that Congress intended estoppel following PGR to apply 
narrowly, only to grounds that were "actually raised," as the final 
committee report repeatedly states.209 Stakeholders viewed PGR, with its 
short nine-month window for filing a petition, as a more limited 
proceeding that should have a more narrow estoppel than IPRs.210 But if 
House Hearing, supra note 192, at 9 (statement of Charles Van Hom, Partner, Finnegan, 
Henderson, Farrabow, Garret & Dunner, on behalfof AIPLA); 157 CONG. REC. S1326 (daily ed. 
Mar. 7, 2011) (statement of Sen. Sessions) ("The bill also includes many protections that were 
long sought by inventors and patent owners. It preserves estoppel against relitigating in court 
those issues that an inter partes challenger reasonably could have raised in his administrative 
challenge."); 157 CONG. REC. S1367 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kohl) ("Patent 
protection will be stronger with the inclusion of 'could have raised' estoppel [and] strong 
administrative estoppel[.]"). 
206. 157 CONG. REC. S1376 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl). 
207. Id. at S1375. 
208. H.R. REP. No. 112-98, pt. 1, at 47 (2011). 
209. Id. at 76 ("Post-grant petitioners are only estopped from raising in civil litigation or IT€ 
proceedings those issues that they actually raised in the post-grant review."); accord id. at 48 
("Further, a final decision in a post-grant review process will prevent the petitioner, a real party 
in interest, or its privy from challenging any patent claim on a ground that was raised in the post­
grant review process."); see also id. at 46, 48 (citing U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra 
note 19l(explaining that the primary reason why stakeholders declined to use the reexamination 
proceedings is that the risk of expansive estoppel was too great in light of the limited nature of 
the proceedings)) (acknowledging the USPTO's concerns raised in its 2004 report that inter partes 
reexamination went largely unused and then expressing that the approach for PGR was "intended 
to remove current disincentives to current administrative processes"). 
210. Matal, supra note 205, at 617; see also Patent Reform Act of2007: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet & Intellectual Prop. ofthe H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 1lOth 
Cong. 98 (2007) [hereinafter 2007 House Hearing] (statement of Anthony Peterman, Director, 
Patent Counsel, Dell Inc.) ("We believe that parties should be precluded from [raising] in 
subsequent proceedings only ... those issues that were addressed and considered in the post grant 
process."); 2004 House Hearing, supra note 191, at 32 (statement of Michael Kirk, Executive 
Director, AIPLA) (testifying with regard to PGRs) ("If the estoppel provision is too harsh, no one 
will use the procedure .... Given the relatively short, nine-month period for initiating an 
opposition and the limited discovery available to the parties, we believe this would strike the right 
balance."); 2004 House Hearing, supra note 191, at 17 (statement of Jeffrey Kushan, Sidley 
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Congress intended the estoppel arising from PGRs to be so different from 
that following IPRs, why does the PGR statutory estoppel provision use 
nearly identical language to that of IPRs, referring to grounds the 
petitioner "raised or reasonably could have raised"? 
Both the bill passed by the Senate and the bill first introduced in the 
House did not contain the phrase "or reasonably could have raised" in the 
estoppel provision applicable to federal court or ITC proceedings 
following PGR.211 Yet the bill as reported by the House Judiciary 
Committee used the phrase "or reasonably could have raised" in all ofthe 
estoppel provisions applicable to both IPR and PGR.212 Joe Matal, a 
senior staffer involved in drafting the provisions, explained, "the change 
appears to have been made in error by staff charged with making 
technical corrections to the bill when it was reported by the House 
Judiciary Committee."213 Statements made by both legislators and 
stakeholders during later proposed technical amendments likewise 
acknowledge this change was an erroneous technical correction.214 Even 
the AIA's namesake Senator Leahy stated after enactment that the "could 
have raised" language in the PGR provision was an "inadvertent 
scrivener's error" that "unintentionally creates a higher threshold of 
estoppel than was [intended by Congress]."215 The "correction" went 
Austin Brown & Wood, on behalf ofGenentech, Inc.) ("Congress should avoid including estoppel 
provisions in any post grant review legislation, and should specifically avoid including provisions 
that are comparable to the codified and uncodified estoppel provisions applicable to inter partes 
reexamination proceedings."); Perspectives ofPatents: Post-Grant Review Procedures and Other 
Litigation Reforms: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop. of the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 45-46 (2003) (statement of Mark Chandler, Senior Vice President and 
General Counsel, Cisco Systems) (recommending "a second window" for post-grant review in 
which the defendant "will be estopped from re-litigating in the court action any issues actually 
raised and decided in the administrative proceeding and subsequent action for judicial review''). 
But see 2007 House Hearing, supra, at 40 (2007) (statement ofKevin Sharer, CEO and Chairman 
of the Board, Amgen, Inc.) ("[C]hallengers who pursue [a postgrant] opposition should be 
prohibited from later disputing the patent's validity in court."). 
211. S. 23, 112th Cong. sec. 5(d), § 325(e)(2) (2011); H.R. 1249, 112th Cong. sec. 5(d), 
§ 325(e)(2) (2011) (as introduced). 
212. H.R. 1249, sec. 6(d), § 325(e)(2). 
213. Mata!, supra note 205, at 618. 
214. Implementation ofthe Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Hearing Before the H Comm. 
on the judiciary, I I 2th Cong. 24 (2012) (testimony ofRobert A. Armitage, Senior Vice President 
and General Counsel of Eli Lilly and Company), http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/ 
Hearings%202012/Armitage%2005162012.pdf (stating "a technical error during the legislative 
process ... inadvertently raised the estoppel" and that the narrower estoppel was "specifically 
supported ... by the major proponents of comprehensive patent reform."); 158 CONG. REC. 
E2017 (daily ed. Dec. 31, 2012) (statement of Rep. Smith) ("The change appears to have been 
made by staffcharged with making technical corrections to the bill, who apparently assumed that 
the omission of could-have-raised estoppel in§ 325(e)(2) was an oversight."). 
215. 158 CONG. REc. S8517 (daily ed. Dec. 28, 2012) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
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unnoticed through enactment, with the 2011 Committee Report 
accompanying the reported bill continuing to discuss the bill as though 
the estoppel that applied in federal courts and the ITC following PGR 
only applied narrowly to issues actually raised: "Post-grant petitioners 
are only estopped from raising in civil litigation or ITC proceedings those 
issues that they actually raised in the post-grant review."216 Technical 
amendments later proposed to correct this error were rejected as 
procedurally improper substantive changes,217 and there was little 
political will at the time to call for substantive changes to the AIA so soon 
after passage.218 Therefore, although some might argue based on the 
legislative history that a broader scope of estoppel should apply with 
respect to IPRs, the legislative history of PGRs indicates that Congress 
intended estoppel to apply only narrowly. 
V. POLICY ANALYSIS 
Policy justifications, like legislative history, should not affect an 
analysis of the scope of the AIA's estoppel provisions given the 
unambiguous language of the text.219 Nonetheless, policy justifications 
would support a narrow reading of the AIA's estoppel provisions. 
A. Addressing the Patent Quality Problem Requires Narrow Estoppel 
A narrow estoppel that does not extend to issues that were never 
litigated plays a key role in supporting the AIA's patent quality goals. 
Among the AIA's goals were "improving patent quality," "providing a 
more efficient system for challenging patents that should not have 
issued," and "reducing unwarranted litigation costs and inconsistent 
damage awards."220 In particular, a key ambition of the new post-grant 
proceedings was to reduce the threat of what legislators considered to be 
216. H.R. REP. No. I 12-98, pt. I, at 76 (201 I); Matal, supra note 205, at 618 
("Unfortunately, no one caught the error during the three and a half months between the time 
when the bill was reported by the committee and when it was signed by the President."). 
2 I 7. Oversight ofthe U.S. Patent and Trademark Office: Implementation ofthe Leahy-Smith 
America Invents Act and International Harmonization Efforts Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, I 12th Cong. 17 (2012) (statement of Sen. Coburn) ("[T]hings greater than technical 
corrections deserve a full and comprehensive hearing where all stakeholders have an opportunity 
to have input. ... [A]nything that significantly changes the estoppel provisions in the bill we 
passed needs to have the full consideration of all the stakeholders and all the members of this 
Committee ...."). 
218. See Abusive Patent Litigation: The Impact on American Innovation and Jobs, and 
Potential Solutions, Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop. & the Internet, H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, I 13th Cong. 15 (statement of Phillip S. Johnson, Chief Intellectual Property 
Counsel, Johnson & Johnson). 
219. Supra Part II.A. 
220. H.R. REP. No. I 12-98, pt. 1 at 39-40. 
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poor quali~221 patents by making it easier to invalidate such patents after 
issuance.22 For years leading up to passage of the AIA in 2011, patent 
stakeholders and scholars had raised increasing alarm over what they 
perceived as an overgrowth ofpoor quality patents.223 According to these 
calls, a thicket of cumulative patents that did not appear to meet the 
conditions for patent eligibility emerged in many technology areas, 
dramatically increasing the cost of doing business or blocking 
commercialization ofproducts developed as those patents spent years or 
decades working their way to the front of the USPTO's lengthy patent 
backlog.224 In the area ofsoftware patents, for example, many argued that 
the USPTO failed for over a decade to hire examiners skilled in this 
technology area and failed to properly classify software art for searching, 
resulting in incomplete examination of such patents.225 
Additionally, by the time the AIA was passed in 2011, the Patent 
Office was facing a budget crisis; Congress had diverted nearly a billion 
dollars of user fees from the Patent Office to non-patent programs, 
221. The term "poor quality" in this Article refers to patents that, on a closer examination, 
would not be found to meet the standards of patent eligibility set out in the Patent Act, such as if 
they are obvious, not novel, or indefinite. 
222. 157 CONG. REC. 9778 (2011) (statement ofRep. Goodlatte) ("[A]fter the PTO issues a 
patent, this legislation creates a new post-grant opposition system in which third parties can raise 
objections to a patent immediately after its issuance, which will both help screen out bad patents 
while bolstering valid ones."); H.R. REP. No. 112-98 pt 1, 39-40 (noting that post-grant 
proceedings will provide an "efficient system for challenging patents that should not have 
issued"). 
223. See, e.g., 157 CONG. REC. 9784 (letter of National Association of Realtors) 
("Modernization is critically needed to improve the quality of issued patents ...."); A PATENT 
SYSTEM FOR THE 21 ST CENrURY, supra note 194; FED. TRADE CoMM'N, supra note 194 (discussing 
stakeholder concerns that numerous patents that are likely invalid as obvious block 
commercialization ofnew innovations in certain technology areas such as software and biotech). 
See generally Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property 
Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577 (1999) 
(discussing business method patents). 
224. 157 CONG. REC. 9784 (statement ofRep. Lofgren) ("The Patent Office has a tremendous 
backlog, and that is a serious concern for inventors and really for the country. The examiners have 
such an enormous backlog, they can't spend sufficient time reviewing the applicants. This has led 
to a flood of poor-quality patents that were issued over the last decade and a half that I think­
and most believe-should have been denied by the office. These dubious patents do significant 
damage to particular industries, like the information technology industry, as they can be used by 
nonpracticing entities to demand rents from legitimate businesses and to interfere with the 
development oflegitimate products."); Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross 
Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, I INNOVATION POL'Y & ECON. 119, 120-21 (2000). 
225. Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 1495, 
1495 n.2 (2001). Lemley argued that the Patent Office's incomplete examination of patents is 
generally rational but noted, "[T]he PTO clearly missed the ball for over a decade [with regard to 
software patents], failing to hire examiners skilled in the software arts or to allow software 
engineers to practice before it, and failing to classify software prior art well." Id. 
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robbing the Patent Office of funding that might otherwise have been used 
to hire and train examiners.226 USPTO examiners spend an average of 
about nineteen hours total reviewing each patent application (with 
variation based on the complexity of the technology). 227 A 2010 report 
commissioned by the Patent Office noted that examiners frequently 
expressed that the amount of time available for them to review each 
patent was "not enough time to do a proper job."228 Recent research has 
demonstrated that such time constraints bias the Patent Office's granting 
practices, increasing the likelihood that it will issue any given patent 
application.229 
The AIA also sought to address the problem of patents issued under 
standards for validity that no longer applied. 230 In the decade leading up 
to passage of the AIA, several key Supreme Court patent cases changed 
what patent stakeholders and examiners believed to be the law.231 These 
changes Elaced the validity of many previously-issued patents into 
question. 32 Legislators hoped that the AIA's new post-grant 
proceedings, especially the transitional CBMR proceedings, would 
provide a less expensive means of challenging patents that were likely 
invalid after recent Supreme Court cases such as Bilski v. Kappas.233 
226. 157 CONG. REC. 9783-84 (statement of Rep. Goodlatte) ("We also need to pass this 
legislation to make sure that the fee diversion, that, as has been noted, has kept nearly $1 billion 
from going to the operation of the Patent Office to work down the 3-year 1 million patent backlog, 
also can be addressed."). 
227. Lemley, supra note 225, at 1500 n.19 (citing Interview with Q. Todd Dickinson, 
Director, USPTO, in Berkeley, Cal. (Apr. 2000)) (noting that examiners spent an average of 
eighteen hours reviewing each patent, ranging from eight hours to thirty-two hours depending on 
technological complexity); see also U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, EXAMINATION TIME ANO 
THE PRODUCTION SYSTEM 16 (2016), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/Examination 
%20Time%20and%20the%20Production%20System.pdf (noting goals of 16.6 hours per 
application on basic technologies and 27.7 hours on certain advanced technologies); Michael D. 
Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, The Failed Promise ofUser Fees: Empirical Evidence from the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 602, 602-36 (2014) 
(calculating average of 19 hours). 
228. Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Is the Time Allocat~d to Review Patent 
Applications Inducing Examiners to Grant Invalid Patents?: Evidence from Micro-Leve/ 
Application Data, 99(3) REV. ECON. & STATS. 550, 550 n.2 (2017) (quoting internal report on file 
with authors, obtained pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act request). 
229. Id. at 561. 
230. See 157 CONG. REc. 9791 (statement ofRep. Smith) ("It is likely that most ifnot all the 
business method patents that were issued after State Street are now invalid under Bilski. There is 
no sense in allowing expensive litigation over patents that are no longer valid."). 
231. Id.; e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 612-13 (2010); KSR Int'I Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 
550 U.S. 398, 427-28 (2007). 
232. See 157 CONG. REC. 9791. 
233. 561 U.S. 593 (2011); 157 CONG. REC. 9791. 
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Ofcourse, reasonably complete and prompt initial examination has an 
important role to play in a functioning patent ecosystem. 234 If the Patent 
Office were to continuously issue patents that would have been found 
invalid if examiners were more knowledgeable about the technology at 
issue or spent only slightly more time spent on review, businesses would 
begin to doubt that issued patents are likely to be upheld when tested. In 
fields where businesses lose trust in the validity of issued patents, they 
may choose to operate in ignorance of them, finding that designing their 
products around sometimes thousands ofpatents is not justified when the 
PTAB or courts will likely find them invalid upon closer review. The 
speed of initial examination is even more important. When patents spend 
years working their way through the Patent Office, only to emerge after 
competitors spent millions on manufacturing and branding, the patent 
holder can extract significantly more value from licensing than may have 
been possible before the competitor invested as much into the product.235 
Yet patent quality is not a problem that can be efficiently solved 
merely by improving initial examination.236 Post-grant challenges to 
issued patents are a critical second half. 237 Low-cost, yet thorough 
adversarial post-grant proceedings that occur shortly after issuance are a 
relatively efficient means ofensuring that the issued patents that are most 
likely to be asserted are valid-these proceedings only result in the 
expense oftesting those patents where the scope and validity are valuable 
to patentees and competitors to determine.238 Moreover, unlike the Patent 
Office, an adversarial party often has an incentive to invest the resources 
necessary to locate prior art or otherwise fully litigate the challenge to the 
patent, as well as incentive to not expend more resources than are justified 
given the value of that patent or the value of clearing that portion of a 
patent thicket.239 A key goal of the AIA's new post-grant review 
processes was to take advantage of the adversarial process to provide 
patents the more thorough review they might not have received during 
234. Polk Wagner, Understanding Patent-Quality Mechanisms, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2135, 
2139-40 (2009) ("[T]he case for better patent quality still carries the day .... [A] patent system 
characterized by low patent quality sows substantial uncertainty at all levels of the patent 
system .... Uncertainty obviously makes business decisions based on patents (whether by 
patentees, prospective licensees, investors, etc.) much more difficult and costly."). 
235. Shapiro, supra note 224, at 120-21. 
236. See generally F. Scott Kief4 The Case for Registering Patents and the Law and 
&onomics of Present Patent-Obtaining Rules, 45 B.C. L. REV. 55 (2003) (advocating for a 
registration-only or "soft-look" initial patent examination); Lemley, supra note 225, at 1496 
(arguing that increasing funds for initial examination might not be the best use ofresources, when 
only a limited number of patents ultimately have value to patentees and competitors). 
237. See Lemley, supra note 225, at 1520. 
238. See id. at 1509-11. 
239. See id. 
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original examination, thereby invalidating those patents "that should not 
have issued," at a faster speed and lower cost than that typically seen in 
litigation.240 Some have raised concern since passage of the AIA that the 
PTAB became a patent "death squad," as it has invalidated at least some 
patent claims in more than 80% of IPRs that resulted in a final written 
decision.241 However, this figure is potentially misleading242 and 
invalidation of patents that were issued in the decades leading up to the 
passage ofthe AIA but do not meet current standards ofpatentability was 
a founding principle ofthe AIA. All patent stakeholders should recognize 
post-grant proceedings as the necessary second halfofan efficient system 
of screening patentability, rather than vilifying these proceedings as a 
killer of valid rights. 
Of course, relying only on adversarial proceedings to police patent 
validity after issuance places much of the cost of testing validity on the 
challenger while providing positive externalities to other competitors and 
the public. Consequently, in some circumstances, the challenger will not 
have adequate incentive to challenge a patent that would otherwise be 
found invalid. As noted, there is value to the marketplace of having, 
enough certainty in the validity of patents at the time of issuance that it 
will be rational for businesses to continue to consider new patents as they 
design and invest in innovations. Therefore, a balanced approach that 
relies on both a quality initial examination and an efficient and thorough 
post-grant review process is critical to ensuring that the patents in force 
are valid, high-quality patents. 
In particular, PGR, which takes place immediately after patent 
issuance, stands to provide the greatest market benefit as an adversarial 
proceeding capable of resolving patentees' or competitors' questions of 
patent validity early in a patent's term. The earlier in a patent's term that 
validity issues can be res~lved, the less waste that will result in the 
marketplace. First, it reduces the frequency of market participants 
incurring unnecessary licensing fees and decreases competitors' costs to 
design around or even abandon potentially infringing products. 
240. H.R. REP. No. 112-98, pt. 1, at 39-40 (2011) (noting one goal ofthe AJA was "providing 
a more efficient system for challenging patents that should not have issued"); 157 CONG. REC. 
9773 (2011) (statement of Rep. Smith) ("The America Invents Act reduces frivolous litigation 
over weak or overbroad patents by establishing a pilot program to review a limited group of 
business method patents that never should have been awarded in the first place."); 157 CONG. 
REC. 9784 (statement ofRep. Lofgren) ("This has led to a flood of poor-quality patents that were 
issued over the last decade and a half that I think-and most believe-should have been denied 
by the office."). 
241. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 7, at 10. 
242. BRIAN C. HOWARD, LEX MACHINA: PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD (PTAB) 2017 
REPoRT 1 (2017), http://pages.lexmachinacom/Email_PTABReport2017_LPRequests.html 
(stating that the "death squad" label is undeserved and finding that looking at instituted petitions, 
rather than just those resulting in a final decision, all claims were invalidated 38% of the time). 
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Additionally, earlier clarification of patentability reduces the patentee's 
risks in bringing a new product to market, the costs ofwhich the patentee 
might not recoup if the patent is invalidated and it loses its exclusive 
rights. 
Nonetheless, under these same principles, where issues of patent 
validity are not addressed in a post-grant proceeding, either because the 
PTAB denies institution or because the petitioner could not include 
legitimate grounds for invalidity within the word limits of the petition or 
did not locate the art in time, the patent quality goals of the AIA are 
served by leaving open the possibility of litigation or other adversarial 
proceedings as a means of resolving the remaining questions of patent 
validity. We can only assure that the patents affecting competition and 
investment in the U.S. are valid if every legitimate ground for patent 
invalidity may be resolved in at least one tribunal after issuance. 
B. Broad Estoppel is Incompatible with the PTAB's Incomplete Review 
PTAB proceedings are not currently an equivalent alternative to 
litigation. Estoppel should not apply as though they are. As noted, after 
passage of the AIA, the PT AB adopted strict procedural limitations on 
PTAB petitions.243 The word count requirement, which applies inclusive 
of claim charts, does not provide enough space for a petitioner in a 
complex technology area to raise all, or even most, legitimate grounds for 
patent invalidity it may have.244 Congress likely did not anticipate that 
the PTAB's implementing procedures would so severely limit the number 
ofgrounds for invalidity that a petitioner could include in the petition for 
review. To the contrary, the legislative history of the AIA indicates that 
Congress envisioned broad post-grant proceedings that would provide 
meaningful, thorough adiudication of grounds for invalidity-a true 
"alternative to litigation."145 • 
If estoppel following post-grant proceedings were broad enough to 
preclude grounds that were not litigated in the PT AB proceeding, it would 
function more like the common law merger doctrine of claim preclusion 
than the doctrine ofestoppel that is its namesake. 246 However, the fairness 
243. See generally 37 C.F.R. § 42.24 (2017) (listing procedural requirements). 
244. See id.; Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 481 n.22 (1982) ("While our 
previous expressions of the requirement of a full and fair opportunity to litigate have been in the 
context of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion, it is clear from what fullows that invocation of 
res judicata or claim preclusion is subject to the same limitation."). 
245. See, e.g., 157 CONG. REc. S5429 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011) (statement of Senator Kyl) 
("[I]n light ofthe present bill's enhanced estoppels, it is important that the section 315(b) deadline 
afford defendants a reasonable opportunity to identify and understand the patent claims that are 
relevant to the litigation."). 
246. See supra Part H.F. 
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ofthe merger doctrine relies upon a key element not applicable in current 
PTAB practice: that the plaintiff has the full opportunity to raise all the 
grounds that will be considered merged into a judgment.247 Instead, in 
post-grant proceedings before the PTAB, the PTAB's procedural limits 
on petitions effectively limit the grounds for invalidity that a petitioner 
can include in its petition.248 Because these practices render post-grant 
proceedings an incomplete review, it would be neither fair to the 
petitioner nor consistent with historical practices in the common law to 
apply a broad estoppel that precludes all grounds for invalidity that could 
have been raised in the petition for review. Future amendments to PT AB 
procedures, such as expanding or eliminating the word or page limits for 
IPRs, could bring IPRs closer to being the "alternative to litigation" of 
the patents and printed publications portion of validity that Congress 
intended. Although the Supreme Court's current, textualist analysis 
would not support broad estoppel even with such amendments, a 
modification of IPR procedures that provides petitioners a full and fair 
opportunity to raise all grounds for invalidity based on patents and printed 
publications would limit the policy-based justifications for narrow 
estoppel. 
C. Narrow Estoppel Will Increase Use ofPGR, as Congress Intended 
A narrower reading of PGR estoppel provisions will increase the use 
of PGR proceedings. Currently, with only 51 petitions having been filed 
between 2012-2017 Gust 1 % of all AIA petitions to date249), PGR is the 
least used of the AIA' s new post-grant proceedings. Because of the broad 
scope ofgrounds for invalidity that may be raised in a PGR, litigants may 
be concerned that if they choose to bring a PGR, a broad reading of the 
AIA's estoppel provisions might bar them from raising essentially any 
invalidity defense in future litigation. 250 This risk could prompt-and, 
based on the low usage ofPGR, appears to be prompting-many litigants 
to either not file a petition for post-grant proceedings at all (instead 
raising the defense only in litigation) or to wait to file a petition for post­
grant proceedings for nine months after issuance, when IPR becomes 
247. See supra Part H.F. 
248. See supra Part H.F. Additionally, prior to the Supreme Court's recent decision in SAS 
Institute that prohibited "partial institution," PTAB decisions were also an incomplete review in 
the sense that they failed to resolve all the claims raised in the petition, unlike adjudication in 
court that resolves all the claims raised in the complaint (and not settled or dismissed). 
249. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 7 (noting that IPRs constituted 92% of 
the 6700 total AIA petitions filed to date, CBMRs constituted 7%, and PGRs constituted 1%). 
250. Cf U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 191, at 5 (noting the low rate of 
usage of inter partes reexamination was primarily due to concerns over a possible broad scope of 
estoppel). 
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available (with its narrower scope and thus narrower potential estoppel 
under a broad reading of the provisions). PGR was created with an 
important ~urpose for controlling patent quality and with the intent that 
it be used. 51 A broad reading of the PGR estoppel provision frustrates 
the purpose of these proceedings. Indeed, as discussed in the legislative 
history section, legislators intended estoppel to apply narrowly following 
PGRs to only those grounds actually raised and addressed in the 
review.252 When courts make clear that these estoppel provisions are to 
be interpreted narrowly, or if Congress amends the PGR estoppel 
provision to correct the drafting error that caused the present language, 
parties will make use of PGR proceedings as intended. 
D. Impact on Later Proceedings 
Although a narrow scope ofestoppel could result in more litigation on 
the merits of invalidity than a broad reading, this is a necessary cost to 
assure estoppel is applied according to the terms of the statute or-under 
a policy approach-in a way that comports with due process and supports 
the AJA' s competing patent quality goals, as discussed above. 
Ultimately, the question of the appropriate scope of estoppel from a 
policy perspective will, in many cases, come to a choice between 
efficiency and completeness. Because a proliferation of issued patents 
that do not meet the conditions ofpatentability have the potential to cause 
public harm, the ability to raise all grounds for invalidity in some forum, 
rather than foreclosing legitimate grounds for invalidity from 
consideration entirely, may outweigh the efficiency concerns oflitigating 
unresolved invalidity questions in district courts. 
Moreover, a narrow scope of estoppel provides more certainty to 
parties as to what grounds will be subject to estoppel, which can curb 
some of the increased litigation expense. Uncertainty as to the scope of a 
litigation increases its cost without benefit to the court or the parties. A 
narrow reading of the estoppel provision provides a clear and certain 
scope to estoppel: Estoppel applies only as to those grounds included in 
the petition, provided the PT AB grants institution. The scope of this 
estoppel is especially clear following the Supreme Court's ruling in SAS 
Industries, which requires the PTAB, if it institutes review, to consider 
all claims and grounds for invalidity that were included in the petition.253 
In contrast, a broad reading makes the scope of estoppel subject to 
expensive discovery and motion practice as to what grounds and art the 
251. H.R. REP. No. 112-98, pt. 1, at 46, 48 (2011) (acknowledging the USPTO's concerns 
raised in its 2004 report that inter partes reexamination went largely unused and then expressing 
that the approach for PGR was "intended to remove current disincentives to current administrative 
processes"). 
252. Supra Part N.C. 
253. SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1354-60 (2018). 
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patent owner should have discovered prior to the PT AB proceeding­
drastically reducing the cost-saving benefits ofavoiding a merits inquiry. 
Some might raise the concern that a narrow reading of the estoppel 
provision would enable the petitioner to strategically file multiple 
successive inter partes review petitions on different art without regard to 
whether the petitioner reasonably should have included that art or 
grounds in the original petition. However, estoppel is not the only, or 
even the primary, mechanism available in the AIA's statutory framework 
to address successive petitioning. For example, the AIA permits the 
PT AB to deny a petition if it presents "the same or substantially the same 
prior art or arguments" as previously before the Office. 254 Moreover, the 
Supreme Court's decision in SAS Industries indicates that the PTAB has 
broad discretion to deny petitions, perhaps even without this 
justification.255 Nonetheless, enabling the petitioner to file multiple 
petitions if the art and arguments are substantially different in each 
petition would increase revenue for the Patent Office and ensure each 
argument has sufficient space to be adequately presented. This could 
potentially result in a patent facing years of repeated reviews, but only if 
each of the grounds raised in later petitions has sufficient merit to justify 
institution and is sufficiently different than prior grounds to not be denied 
for improper successive petitioning or for another reason under PT AB' s 
discretion. Addressing legitimate grounds for invalidity on the merits in 
at least one forum after issuance helps to assure that the patents that have 
the greatest impact on investment and competition meet current standards 
of patentability. 
CONCLUSION 
Applying the Supreme Court's modem, textualist approach to 
statutory interpretation yields only one appropriate interpretation of the 
AIA's estoppel provision: "[D]uring that ... review" refers to the time 
period after institution of the IPR and before a final decision from the 
Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PT AB), limiting estoppel only to grounds 
on which the PTAB institutes review, even if they were not raised in the 
petition for review. Although the Federal Circuit has generally favored a 
textualist reading of this statute, it has yet to address how the estoppel 
standard would apply as to grounds that the petitioner chose not to include 
254. 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) (2012) ("In determining whether to institute or order a proceeding 
under this chapter [PGR and CBMR], chapter 30 [reexamination], or chapter 31 [IPR], the 
Director may take into account whether, and reject the petition or request because, the same or 
substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office."). This 
authority is separate from, and in addition to, the estoppel effect of prior decisions. See id. 
§§ 315(e), 325(e). 
255. 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1351 (2018) ("§ 314(a) invests the Director with discretion on the 
question whether to institute review ....") (emphasis in original). 
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in the petition for IPR. When the Federal Circuit or the Supreme Court 
next has occasion to consider this issue, applying the sound principles of 
statutory interpretation explained and analyzed in this Article will yield a 
narrow estoppel. 
Although legislative history indicates that, at least for IPRs, those 
outspoken members of Congress who addressed this issue intended a 
broad estoppel that would make PT AB proceedings an alternative to 
litigation of the patents-and-printed publications portion of invalidity, 
this legislative history cannot, under the Supreme Court's current 
approach, usurp the text of the statute. Indeed, the constitutional 
principles of bicameralism and presentment require Congress to express 
its intent through the text, not through statements made on the floor of 
Congress or in committee reports but left out of the text. Therefore, if a 
broader scope of estoppel is justified by legislative history, policy, or 
other concerns, it is the duty of Congress to amend its text rather than of 
the duty ofthe courts to interpret statutory estoppel more broadly than the 
text permits. 
Here, however, a narrow scope of estoppel comports with the stated 
policy goals of the AIA. In light of the strict limits on IPR petitions 
adopted by the PT AB, which Congress did not foresee, and which 
effectively limit the grounds for invalidity a petitioner may raise during 
the IPR, IPR currently does not function as a true alternative to litigation. 
Moreover, broadening estoppel to effectively remove certain patents 
from thorough judicial review undermines the AIA' s goal ofreevaluating 
the most competitively important patents to ensure that they are 
patentable, particularly after several Supreme Court decisions that 
changed what many believed to be the law. Initial examination, while 
critically important to a functioning patent system, cannot efficiently 
function as the only screen for patentability. Ifestoppel is applied broadly 
to grounds for invalidity that were never litigated, some patents will 
remain in force that do not meet current standards for patentability. 
Narrow estoppel helps to ensure that the patents in force-those where 
patentees are collecting licensing fees, and forcing competitors to design 
around, and winning infringement lawsuits-are valid. Although these 
policy arguments do not carry weight under the Supreme Court's current 
approach to statutory interpretation, they should help to ameliorate 
concerns of the consequences of a narrow statutory interpretation of 
estoppel. 
